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Preface
Traditional economic theory assumes that individuals are self-interested. Namely, they are
exclusively interested in their own utility disregarding the benefits that their action causes to
the others. However, the assumption of selfish individuals proves unable to explain a num-
ber of important phenomena and puzzles. Individuals frequently engage in activities that
are costly to themselves and mostly benefit others. They vote, volunteer time, help strangers,
give to political or charitable organizations, donate blood, and sometimes even risk or sac-
rifice their life for strangers. A possible explanation for these actions is that the behavior of
the individuals can be affected by altruistic, equity and reciprocity considerations (see for
example Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). In this sense individuals can be intrinsically motivated:
“One is said to be intrinsically motivated to perform an activity when he receives no appar-
ent reward except the activity itself" (Deci, 1971).
In this thesis, I analyze how intrinsic motivation affects individuals’ behavior in a number
of different situations, such as a public good contribution problem or a school selection of
motivated teachers. Furthermore, I am interested in understanding how people respond to
different incentives in order to better inform policies.
This dissertation comprises three chapters.
In the first chapter, I elaborate an overview on the impact of intrinsic motivation on the indi-
viduals’ choice in several economic environments. In the first part of the overview, I consider
a public good problem in which individuals can be intrinsically motivated. Each individual
can be interested not only in his own utility but also in the utility of the others. Even if the
intrinsic motivation has a positive impact on the levels of public good contributed, it seems
difficult to achieve the socially optimal level of contribution.
When intrinsic motivations alone are not sufficient to supply the socially optimal level, a
principal’s intervention is necessary. The intervention usually takes the form of monetary
incentives such as payments or regulations. These incentives can crowd out the intrinsic




In the second part of this overview, I analyze the interaction between intrinsic motivation
and monetary incentives in order to understand how people respond to incentives. In this
sense, this work is also related to the literature on psychological incentives in organizations
(Bénabou and Tirole, 2003, 2006; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000a, 2000b). A key prediction
of this literature is that motivation is effective in stimulating effort even in the absence of a
monetary compensation.
This review considers implications regarding the design of optimal incentives and public
policy, the selection of motivated agents and its interaction with monetary rewards.
In the second chapter, I develop a principal-agent model where the individuals are the (male)
agents that are asked to contribute to the public good. The key assumption of this model is
that individuals may care not only about their personal interest but also about the well-being
of the others. There are only two types of agents: the self-interested agents and the motivated
agents. The principal may not have information on the type of agents that contribute to the
public good.
With perfect information, the motivated individuals exert higher levels of effort than the un-
motivated individuals. The principal offers a transfer that just covers the cost of effort in-
curred by the agent minus his direct benefit deriving from directly enjoying the public good
and the indirect benefit tied to his intrinsic motivation. In this case, both individuals obtain
higher benefits than costs by contributing to the public good and they are taxed. In addition,
motivated individuals pay higher taxes than the unmotivated individuals. This is because
motivated individuals exert a given level of effort even if they pay higher taxes for that.
With incomplete information, the principal gives up information rents in order to induce
separation of types. Of course, the magnitude of these rents will be crucially affected by their
degree of motivation. Motivated individuals exert higher levels of effort with respect to the
first-best. In contrast, unmotivated individuals exert lower levels of effort with respect to the
first-best. In addition, both individuals will be taxed but the motivated individuals will be
taxed less than the unmotivated individuals. Otherwise, the motivated individual will not
provide higher levels of effort.
In the last chapter, I study the “market" for education by developing a model that focuses
on the interaction between the public and private educational sectors. The schools offer
heterogeneous educational services. Parents and students choose between public and pri-
vate schools considering the differences in the programmes and the quality of the education
provided by the schools. The quality is influenced by the effort exerted by the teachers.
In this model, teachers can take satisfaction from teaching and from developing strategies
that are consistent with the best interest of the students. In this sense, teachers can be in-
trinsically motivated.
The aim of this model is to investigate the impact of intrinsic motivation on the schools’
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outcome in terms of quality, price and wage in a mixed duopoly environment (see for an
overview De Fraja and Delbono, 1990, and Nett, 1993).
To this end, I develop an oligopolistic model where two schools are positioned at each end of
a Hotelling line. The horizontal differentiation reflects the heterogeneity of the programmes
offered by the schools. While the private school maximizes its profits, the public school
maximizes social welfare. Each school consists of a principal and an agent, both risk neu-
tral. The principal-agent relationship can be interpreted as the relationship between the
school-principal who wants to delegate the decision about an outcome in terms of quality
to a teacher (the agent).
The two schools offer imperfectly substitutable programmes and they compete against each
other on quality and prices. When the degree of substitutability is high, the schools offer
similar programmes and there is more competition in the market.
I show that the presence of motivated teachers can benefit or hurt public and private schools
depending on the degree of differentiation between the programmes offered by the two
schools. When there is high competition in the education “market”, both schools prefer to
hire motivated teachers in order to attract students. In this case, teachers’ motivation plays
an important role in the students’ choice between schools. In contrast, if the schools offer
significantly different programmes, the teachers’ intrinsic motivation becomes relatively less
important. In that case, both schools obtain higher benefits by hiring self-interested teachers
than by hiring motivated teachers. The Nash-equilibrium is the one in which both schools
hire selfish teachers.
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Chapter 1
An Overview on Incentive Design for
Motivated Agents
I develop an overview on the impact of intrinsic motivation on the individuals’ choice in several
economic environments. I start by considering a public good problem in which individuals can
be intrinsically motivated. Even if the intrinsic motivation has a positive impact on the levels of
public good contributed, it seems difficult to achieve the socially optimal level of contribution.
When intrinsic motivations alone are not sufficient to supply the socially optimal level, a princi-
pal’s intervention is necessary. The intervention usually takes the form of monetary incentives.
These incentives may conflict with individuals’ intrinsic motivation. I analyze the interaction be-
tween intrinsic motivation and monetary incentives in order to understand how people respond
to incentives. In this sense, this work is related to the literature on psychological incentives in
organizations (Bénabou and Tirole, 2003, 2006; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000a, 2000b). A key pre-
diction of this literature is that motivation is effective in stimulating effort even in the absence of
a monetary compensation. This overview is also related to the literature on the self-selection of
motivated employees in different sectors (see for instance Besley and Ghatak, 2005, and Prender-
gast, 2007). This literature suggests that the public sector pays lower incentives to attract moti-
vated employees. This review examines implications regarding the design of optimal incentives
and public policy, the selection of motivated agents and its interaction with monetary rewards.
Keywords: Intrinsic Motivation, Monetary and Non-Monetary Incentives, Public Good Problem,
Selection of Motivated Employees.
1.1 Introduction
The main objective of this chapter is to develop an overview on the impact of intrinsic mo-
tivation on the individuals’ choice in several economic environments: “One is said to be
intrinsically motivated to perform an activity when he receives no apparent reward except
1
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the activity itself" (Deci, 1971).
The standard models based on the self-interested assumption can sometimes provide mis-
leading predictions. In a public good problem, for example, if individuals only maximize
their egoistic payoffs disregarding the well-being of the others, individuals would pursue
their own utility through free-riding. Then, there will be under-provision of the public good
(as shown in Bergstrom et al., 1986).1
Experimental results do not support this prediction (for a review on the experiments’ results
see Polania-Reyes and Bowles, 2012). In a typical public good experiment, each member is
given a sum of money. They may keep this money for themselves or contribute some or all
of it to a group fund. Contribution to the fund are doubled, and are then split equally among
all members of the group. Total payoff will be maximized if everyone contributes all of their
initial sum. However, each individual has an incentive to free-ride (see for example Ledyard,
1995). In contrast, a typical result of the experiments is that many people contribute to a
public good supporting activities that are costly to themselves and mostly benefit others.
A possible explanation for these results is that the behavior of individuals can be affected by
altruistic, equity, and reciprocity considerations (see for example Fehr and Schmidt, 1999).
Economists have developed theoretical models and found empirical evidence showing that
individuals can be “intrinsically motivated" (see for example Andreoni, 1990, and Rabin,
1993). Some individuals can be interested not only in their monetary compensation but
also in the well-being of the others. Then, they would decide to cooperate, contributing to
the public good, even when faced with the opportunity to increase their consumption of the
private good.
In the first part of this overview, I consider a public good problem in which individuals can be
intrinsically motivated. More specifically, the objective function of each individual depends
on his own utility and on the utility of the others. In this model, the consumption outcome
critically depends on their degree of intrinsic motivation. In addition, the existence of an
efficient outcome requires the highest degree of interest by individuals. Hence, it seems dif-
ficult to achieve the socially optimal level of contribution.
When intrinsic motivations alone are not sufficient to supply the socially optimal level, gov-
ernment intervention is necessary. The intervention usually takes the form of monetary in-
centives such as payments or regulations. These incentives can crowd out the intrinsic moti-
vations which prompt voluntary actions. If so, a policy may fail to achieve the desired effect.
It is even possible for a costly policy intervention to lead to a decrease in the overall public
good provision, as individuals cease to contribute voluntarily.
In the second part of this overview, I look at the interaction between intrinsic motivation and
monetary incentives in order to understand how people respond to incentives to better in-
form policies. Monetary incentives may come into conflict with intrinsic motivation. This is
1In extreme formulations of this model, the Nash equilibrium without intrinsic motivation is simply zero
contribution.
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because monetary incentives may signal distrust or that achieving a specific goal is difficult
as shown in the literature on psychological incentives in organizations (Bénabou and Tirole,
2003, 2006; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000a, 2000b).
The study of the interaction between monetary incentives and intrinsic motivation also leads
to interesting results concerning the selection of employees between public and private sec-
tor (see for example Besley and Ghatak, 2005, and Prendergast, 2007). A key prediction of
this literature is that intrinsically motivated individuals exert a given level of effort even in
the absence of a monetary compensation for that. This leads to self-selection of job appli-
cants with high motivation. Furthermore, this literature suggests that the public sector pays
lower incentives than the private sector to attract motivated employees.
The chapter is organized as follows: in section 1.2 I present a public good problem in which
individuals can be intrinsically motivated; in section 1.3 I study the intervention of a prin-
cipal and I discuss some general aspects of how monetary incentives may conflict with in-
trinsic motivation; section 1.4 is devoted to the study of the effect of monetary incentives on
the employees’ selection in different sectors; and, finally, concluding remarks are given in
section 1.5.
1.2 A Non-Cooperative Public Good Model with Motivated In-
dividuals
I begin by studying a non-cooperative model where each individual chooses his level of con-
sumption independently of the others’ decisions.2 There are two members, A and B con-
suming goods that are regarded by both as being either private (in q) or public (in Q).3 They
decide over the purchase of a bundle of N private goods at the market price p, and a bundle
of K public goods at the prices Pk . The first private good is treated as numeraire and it is
assumed that the consumption of the numeraire and all public goods is strictly positive.
I take into account that each individual can differ in his preferences. Then, the preferences
of individual A are represented by a utility function:
V A =U A(q A,Q)+βAU B (qB ,Q), (1.1)
and the ones of individual B are represented by a utility function:
V B =U B (qB ,Q)+βBU A(q A,Q), (1.2)
2I consider a non-cooperative model given its theoretical appeal. More specifically, any Nash equilibrium is
stable in the sense that no individual can increase his utility by unilaterally changing her/his strategy.
3This focus on two individuals is mainly to keep the exposition simple. However, the following analysis can
readily be extended to situations with more than two individuals.
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Both utility functions are increasing and strictly concave.
βJ measures the degree of interest towards the other individual with J = A,B . I assume that
it can differ among individuals and βJ ∈ [0,1].
In this construction, βA =βB = 0 stands for egoistic preferences in which each utility depends
on the individuals’ own consumption of private goods (q A and qB , respectively) and the total
amount of public goods (Q), i.e. V A =U A(q A,Q) and V B =U B (qB ,Q).
In contrast, when an individual benefits from increasing the utility of the other member,
βJ > 0 stands for caring preferences. If βA = βB = 1 the two individuals care a lot about each
other and their preferences coincide, i.e. V A =V B =U A(q A,Q)+U B (qB ,Q).
Each individual J is endowed with an income Y that she/he can independently use for the
purchase of public and private goods.
The individuals maximize their objective functions under the following budget constraint:
p(q A +qB )+PQ ≤ Y J (1.3)
and feasibility constraints:
Q A +QB =Q; q A +qB = q (1.4)
Let ∂U
J (q J ,Q)
∂q J1
be the marginal utility of the numeraire for individual J , i.e. the first private
good, the individual willingness to pay for the public good is equal to τJk (q
J ,Q) =
∂U J (q J ,Q)
∂Qk
∂U J (q J ,Q)
∂q J1
.
Solving both problems simultaneously, I obtain the following result:
Proposition 1.1. Let (q A, qB , Q A, QB ) be an equilibrium with degree of caring βA,βB ∈ [0,1]
such that:
max{τAk (q
A,Q)+βBβAτBk (qB ,Q),τBk (qB ,Q)+βAβBτAk (q A,Q)} = Pk (1.5)
for all public goods k. When βAβB = 0, it is a Nash equilibrium of the game with voluntary
contributions to public goods without caring. When βAβB = 1, it is a Cooperative equilibrium.
Proof. All the mathematical computations are shown in the Appendix A.
To derive some intuitions out of the above proposition, it is needed to study more in detail
the two benchmark cases, i.e. the noncooperative model without caring and the fully coop-
erative model.
When the individuals are selfish, the objective functions reduce to “egoistic" functions, i.e.




B ,Q)} = Pk (1.6)
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see Cherchye, Demuynck and De Rock (2011).
By contrast, when βA = βB = 1, the objective functions V A and V B coincide and both indi-
viduals optimize the same objective function. By construction, this implies a cooperative
equilibrium (i.e. a Pareto optimal allocation):
τAk (q
A,Q)+τBk (qB ,Q) = Pk (1.7)
The Pareto efficient allocation satisfies the Lindahl-Bowen-Samuelson Conditions (see, for
example, Samuelson, 1954) in which the sum of the members’ marginal willingness to pay is
equal to the market prices.
The model captures all possible equilibria between the fully cooperative equilibrium and
the non cooperative equilibrium without caring. Indeed, the set of equilibria includes at one
extreme the fully cooperative case (the only efficient one) and, at the other extreme, the non-
cooperative equilibrium of the “game with voluntary contributions to public goods without
caring".
The cooperative equilibrium seems difficult to achieve because “too much care", i.e. βA =
βB = 1, is needed (Manna, 2012). Then, a cooperative equilibrium is achieved only if each
individual puts the same weight on his own utility and on the utility of the other. Looking at a
contribution game in general, it seems an exception rather than the rule. If both individuals
have low degree of caring, at least one individual increases his utility by deviating from the
Pareto optimal allocation.
In conclusion, the existence of the Pareto efficient equilibrium requires a relatively high de-
gree of caring of the two individuals. The fully cooperative case, where βA = βB = 1, always
satisfies this condition, provided that there is full symmetry in the individuals’ preferences.
1.3 When intrinsic motivation alone is not enough
In the first part of this overview, I analyzed the individuals’ choice in terms of contribution
to a public good when individuals can be intrinsically motivated. They made their decision
simultaneously and without the intervention of a principal. In some cases, intrinsically mo-
tivated individuals are able to supply public goods at efficient levels.4 However, many public
goods are undersupplied.
The failure of voluntary contribution to lead to a Pareto optimal allocation, when people be-
have non-cooperatively, suggests there may be a role for the government in providing the
public good. Governments may provide additional incentives to increase their provision.
4For instance, in Australia people voluntary supply sufficient blood donations despite the absence of any
formal incentive (see Reeson, 2008).
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An incentive is anything (monetary and not monetary) that motivates a person to undertake
a particular action or choose an alternative instead of another. People can be motivated to
contribute by formal incentives. Payments may be used to subsidize contributions, or reg-
ulations to mandate a minimum contribution. Such incentives are extrinsic, that is they are
dependent on external rewards or sanctions, as opposed to intrinsic incentives which are
inherent to an individual (Deci, 1971).
If each individual’s preferences are publicly known, the principal can easily implement the
efficient level of public-good provision in so improving the outcome under voluntary pro-
vision. If preferences are private information, the principal has to elicit the information
needed to approach the optimum. Because this information has to come from the individ-
uals who hold it, the question is how to give these individuals incentives to properly reveal
this information.
In this part of the overview, I discuss some general aspects of how extrinsic incentives may
come into conflict with intrinsic motivation. The reason why there might be an interac-
tion between extrinsic incentives and intrinsic motivation is that these elements operate on
different psychological mechanisms. The psychological sources of intrinsic motivation are
non-selfish motives, like altruism and inequity aversion. By contrast, monetary incentives
give to the agent a selfish motive to act.5 Moreover, explicit incentive contracts may signal
distrust and introduce an element of control that might undermine effort exerted by moti-
vated individuals (Falk and Kosfeld, 2006). Monetary incentives from principals may change
how tasks are perceived by agents. If incentives are not large enough, this change in per-
ception can lead to undesired effects on behavior. In other cases, incentives might have the
desired effects in the short term, but they still weaken intrinsic motivations.
The negative effects of monetary incentives are due to the fact that people act not only to
acquire economic goods and services but also to constitute themselves as dignified, au-
tonomous and moral individuals. By contrast, implicit incentives may support the actions of
the individuals because the strategic incentives do not contradict individuals’ intrinsic mo-
tivation (Gächter, Kessler and Königstein, 20116).
In the following subsections, I will analyze more in detail the literature on psychology incen-
tives, the impact of intrinsic motivation for performing a particular task and the interaction
between monetary incentives and intrinsic motivation.
5In the public good experiment designed by Falkinger et al. (2000), subjects at first experience a monetary
incentive system which proves very effective in increasing contributions to the public good. Later they play the
same game without incentives and they contribute the 26% less than subjects who have not been exposed to
the incentives.
6In this paper, they also show that there is no reason why the voluntary cooperation of non-selfish people
should be adversely affected by implicit incentives and that they reinforce reciprocal motivations.
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1.3.1 The relation between extrinsic and intrinsic incentives
Economic theory emphasizes the importance of incentives. Providing rewards contingent
upon effort or positive performance directly encourages positive effort. While there is sub-
stantial evidence consistent with this point of view, there is also an argument that explicit
rewards may have the adverse consequence of crowding out the agent’s intrinsic motivation
for performing the task.7 Monetary incentives have two kinds of effects: the standard direct
price effect, which makes the incentivized behavior more attractive, and an indirect psycho-
logical effect. In some cases, the psychological effect works in an opposite direction with
respect to the price effect and can crowd out the incentivized behavior. Several papers in
recent years have shown that such crowding-out effects can be handled with fairly standard
economic modeling of principal-agent problems that use intrinsic motivation assumptions.
Bénabou and Tirole (2003) assume that the principal has more information than the agent.
Any incentive contract offered by the principal has the potential to convey this information
to the agent. For example, if the principal has superior information about the difficulty of the
project, then a contract that promises a high-reward contingent on a success might convey
the message to the agent that the job is difficult to perform. In their basic model, increasing
compensation increases the probability that an agent will supply effort, but also signals to
the agent that the job is distasteful or that effort is unlikely to lead to a success. They show
that rewards may be only weak reinforcers in the short term and that, as stressed by psy-
chologists, they may have hidden costs, in that they become negative reinforcers once they
are withdrawn. The idea is that by offering low-powered incentives, the principal signals that
she trusts the agent. Conversely, rewards (extrinsic motivation) have a limited impact on cur-
rent performance, and reduce the agent’s motivation to undertake similar tasks in the future.
Then, they use the same logic to show that empowering the agent is likely to increase his in-
trinsic motivation. Similarly, help offered by others may be detrimental to one’s self-esteem
and create a dependence. The “crowding out" case requires the agent be less knowledgeable
in some dimension than the principal. Furthermore, sorting condition must hold, in that the
principal has to be more inclined to offer a reward when the agent has limited ability or the
task is unattractive. Otherwise, there will be “crowding in". Thus, when concerned about a
potential negative impact of rewards, one should first check whether the reward provider has
private information about the task or the agent’s talent. One should then, as the agent does,
think through the provider’s ulterior motivation and how her payoff from giving a contingent
reward is affected by her knowledge.
In Bénabou and Tirole (2006), individuals have a utility function with three main compo-
nents: they value extrinsic rewards, enjoy doing an activity, and care about their image vis-
à-vis themselves or others. The image component depends on the value they or someone
else attributes to their intrinsic and extrinsic motivation as a function of their effort level and
7See Deci and Ryan (1985) for a survey.
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incentives. This image motivation depends on how much individuals care for their repu-
tation and may be affected by how public such an image is. Individual preferences for the
enjoyment of tasks and for the image component of their utility may differ between people
and are assumed to be private information. In this model, extrinsic incentives reduce other
motives for undertaking the task if a higher personal benefit associated with a certain level
of pro-social behavior affects the reputational value attributed to a person’s intrinsic and ex-
trinsic motivation. That is, decreasing the signal about a person’s pro-social preferences and
increasing the signal about a person’s greediness may result in lower image motivation. In
such cases, offering higher material rewards may backfire if the effect on image motivation is
stronger than the standard price effect. This effect may depend on the extent to which these
signals are public.
The models, explained in these two articles, illustrate how the principal’s incentive gives a bad
information to the agents and can affect agents’ decisions about effort. In a private-good con-
text without image concerns and in which the principal is better informed than the agent,
the principal chooses a reward level based on several factors, including how the principal
views the difficulty or attractiveness of the task to be performed and how the principal views
the intrinsic motivation or ability of the agent. For example, offering incentives for improved
academic performance in schools may signal that achieving a specific goal is difficult, that
the task is not attractive, or that the agent is not well-suited for it (and thus needs the addi-
tional incentive of a reward). Alternatively, offering incentives could signal that the principal
does not trust the agent’s intrinsic motivation. This signal will be “bad news" for the agent
and can lower the intrinsic motivation of the agent to undertake the task. Considering the
image concerns, extrinsic incentives may have a negative impact on the performance of the
individuals. This is because the monetary incentives reduce the moral approbation behind
the action and replace it with a simple monetary compensation.
Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a and 2000b) present evidence for explicit incentives having
counterintuitive influences in laboratory and natural experiments. Gneezy and Rustichini
(2000a) show that the imposition of an explicit penalty for failing to pick up a child on time
at a day-care center leads to a decrease in the number of people who pick up their child on
time. They suggest that a mechanism similar to the one described by Benabou and Tirole
is at work. The incentive scheme conveys information to the agent, which leads to a coun-
terintuitive response. The authors argue that the fine eliminated the moral disapprobation
associated with arriving late and replaced it with a simple monetary cost which some par-
ents decided was worth incurring. Their results show that the effect of price changes can be
quite different than in economic theory when behavior has moral components which wages
and prices alter. In the day-care setting of Gneezy and Rustichini (2000b), they show that the
level of performance in a task is not monotonic in monetary rewards. Imposing a modest
fine for late pick ups could lower the agent’s subjective probability that an even more severe
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penalty would be imposed.
The psychology literature suggests that crowding out does not depend on the ability of incen-
tive schemes to convey information about the task, but instead argues that monetary incen-
tives change preferences in systematic ways. These reasons illustrate possible behavioral ef-
fects of incentives and create implications for the design of incentives.
1.3.2 When do monetary incentives crowd out or crowd in intrinsic moti-
vation? (Bowles and Hwang, 2008)
Of course the crowding-out evidence discussed above does not imply that using incentives
to obtain behavioral changes will always be counterproductive. Experimental evidence in-
dicates that conventional economic incentives and intrinsic motivation may be either com-
plements or substitutes.
Bowles and Hwang (2008) analyze theoretically when monetary incentives crowd in or crowd
out intrinsic motivation. Furthermore, they investigate if a social planner, aware of the
crowding out problem, would make more or less use of the monetary incentives relative to a
naive planner who assumes that economic and intrinsic motives are separable.
To achieve this objective, they develop a model in which individuals have a set of ethical
values that may motivate the individuals’ behavior and let these values be influenced (posi-
tively or negatively) by the use of explicit incentives.
They consider a community of identical individuals indexed by i = 1, ...,n who may con-
tribute to a public project by taking an action, ai ∈ [0,1], at a cost g (ai ) which is non-negative,
increasing and convex in its argument. The output of the project depends on individual con-
tribution, ψ(a1, a2, ..., an), and explicit incentives take the form of a subsidy s that is positive
or equal to 0 and proportional to the amount contributed.8
The individual i’s utility is:
ui =ψ(a1, a2, ..., an)+ sai − g (ai )+ v(ai , s) (1.8)
where v(ai , s) represents the ethical values and has the following explicit form: v = ai (v+λs)
and the marginal effect of i’s contributing on i’s values is vai = v +λs. The classical separa-
bility assumption maintains that the level of monetary incentives does not influence the
marginal utility of contributing: that is λ= 0. Varying ai to maximize ui for given values of s
and the others’ contributions, the individual’s best response ai is given by:
g ′(ai ) =ψai + s + v +λs (1.9)
8They do not consider the case of taxes (i.e. s < 0) because motivational crowding is not symmetric: in
experiments, both bonuses and fines crowd out social preferences (though typically in different degree) so one
cannot reverse the crowding effect by adopting taxes rather than subsidies.
CHAPTER 1. AN OVERVIEW ON INCENTIVE DESIGN FOR MOTIVATED AGENTS 10
where the left hand side represents the marginal cost of contributing and right hand side
terms represent the marginal benefits arising from the project and from subsidies, and the
marginal benefits associated with the individual’s contribution, respectively.
Thanks to the implicit function theorem, the effect of the subsidy on the individual’s contri-






where the denominator is positive by the second order condition of the individual’s opti-
mization problem (in the case of a convex benefit function for the public project, requiring
that the marginal costs of contributing be rising faster than the marginal private material
benefits). It is possible to see that there is either crowding in (λ> 0) or crowding out (λ< 0).
Under crowding in, ethical values and incentives are complements, as increased use of the
incentive enhances the marginal effect of contributing on one’s values and the effect of the
subsidy increases the individuals’ action. Crowding out makes incentives and ethical values
substitutes, reducing the effect of incentives on the individuals’ behavior. If λ < −1 there
is “strong" crowding out and the incentives reduce contributions. Moreover, a positive re-
sponse by subjects to explicit incentives does not indicate that crowding out is absent but
only that λ>−1.
If crowding out is so strong that the incentive has an effect opposite to its intent, the social
planner would reduce the monetary incentives. By contrast, where the effectiveness of in-
centives is blunted but not reversed, the implications for the optimal use of incentives are
far from obvious. The reduced effectiveness of the incentive associated with crowding out
would entail a larger incentive for a planner designing a subsidy to ensure compliance with
a quantitative target. As a result, crowding out makes the incentive less effective, so that to
attain the target, more incentive is needed.
In conclusion, while explicit incentives do a tolerably good job in many situations, in others
performance would be improved if mechanism design took account of the effects of incen-
tives on preferences.
A potential extension to this article could be to study the case in which the population is
made up of both self-interested and motivated individuals, as it is suggested by experimental
evidence. In this case some mechanisms provide incentives that induce even the motivated
individuals to act as if they were selfish and self-interested individuals to act as if they were
motivated.
1.3.3 Some Economic Applications
In the following subsections, I discuss the impact of monetary incentives on the individuals’
choice in different circumstances. I analyze a theoretical model of household recycling, in
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which the public policy has an impact on the individuals’ perception of the morally ideal ac-
tion. Then, I examine the effect of monetary incentives in education. In this case, monetary
incentives can be successful if the incentives are well-specified and well-target.
Image Motivation in Household Recycling (A theoretic Model of Brekke, Kverrndokk and
Nyborg, 2003)
Economically household recycling activities contribute to the production of public goods
such as improved environmental quality. Recent decades have seen the introduction of sanc-
tions and payments in an attempt to maintain the supply of environmental goods and ser-
vices. However, the possibility of crowding out indicates that the policy can be less effective
than expected, or even trigger a reduction in supply.9 This is because individuals are willing
to supply many environmental goods and services even in absence of monetary incentives.
Such voluntary contributions are due to intrinsically motivated individuals.
Brekke, Kverndokk and Nyborg (2003) assume that consumers want to think of themselves
as socially responsible, which is in turn determined by the distance between one’s actual be-
havior and a morally ideal action.
In mathematical terms, the self-image of the individuals is given by the following loss func-
tion:
Sdi =−K (ai −a∗i )2 (1.11)
where Sdi is the self-image as a responsible individual, K > 0, ai is the actual behavior, and
a∗i is the individual’s perception of the morally ideal behavior. With the chosen functional
form, the individual’s self-image attains a global maximum equal to zero at ai = a∗i . This
means that the function is concave in ai : it is increasing in ai for ai < a∗i , and falling in ai for
ai > a∗i . Further, self-image is decreasing in a∗i for ai < a∗i , and increasing in a∗i for ai > a∗i .
From i ’s perspective, the morally ideal contribution is the action which would hypothetically
maximize social welfare if everybody else had acted as she herself did. Then, a∗i can be inter-
preted as the individual’s perception of her responsibility as a responsible citizen which may
be determined by moral or other considerations. If she contributes less than this level, she
does not fulfill her duty, and thus experiences a utility loss in terms of a reduced self-image.
Their model has similarity to the “warm glow" model of Andreoni (1990), because the cynical
view on moral behavior as simply serving the private interest of having good conscience. An-
dreoni (1990) introduces a generalization of the altruistic model. In his article, he elaborates
the idea that giving produces a pleasurable feeling, the “warm glow", which is formulated as
a preference for giving per sé, distinct from the benefit enjoyed by the recipient. The idea is
9This can be particularly likely if payments are relatively small as is the case for many environmental incen-
tives.
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that one’s own contribution to a public good produces a private good, warm glow, as a by-
product of contributing to the public good. Andreoni refers to an individual with preferences
for such a warm glow as an “impure altruist". Furthermore, he assumes that the individuals
are not indifferent between gifts made by themselves and gifts made by the other individuals
or the government. While the warm glow (or impure altruist) individual contributes for the
pure pleasure of the giving, the duty-oriented person contributes to keep her self-image as a
responsible citizen. Moreover, the impure altruist derives a strictly positive (non-pecuniary)
benefit from making a contribution, the duty-oriented person suffers a utility loss if he con-
tributes less than he believes he ought to. Consequently, if his perceived duty increases, thus
making the goal harder to reach, his utility will be reduced, but he may still increase his con-
tributions (see Bruvoll and Nyborg, 2004). Both models of Andreoni (1990) and Brekke et al.
(2003) reach the same conclusion regarding the under-provision of public good, even if the
reason for under-provision is different.
Brekke et al. (2003) demonstrate with their model that monetary incentives may decrease
morally motivated contributions. Public policy affects behavior not only through its effect
on relative prices and budget, but also through the policy’s effects on individuals’ perception
of the morally ideal action.10
To test the empirical relevance of the theoretical model, they use Statistic Norway’s Omnibus
survey for November-December 1999 concerning with recycling of household waste. The
survey data on recycling and voluntary community work are consistent with the idea that
public policy has an impact on individuals’ perception of the morally ideal action. If duty-
based motives are important for voluntary contributions, any policy designed to increase
contributions should take into account that although people may contribute out of a feeling
of responsibility, they may also try to avoid situations in which this feeling arises. Then, the
duty-oriented people have been placed in a situation where they feel to have a responsibility
for others and they act accordingly. However, when my responsibility is being exploited by
another person, my duty towards that disappears. A proper understanding of the causes of
social interaction effects in voluntary contributions to public goods is potentially important
for policy analysis.
10In a given context, the individual may be unsure of what is and what is not his responsibility; and if so, he
may look at the others to infer what is demanded of a “proper" citizen. That is, informational social influence
can come into play, causing social interaction in individual contributions (Nyborg et al., 2005). Nyborg et al.
(2005) assume that when the individual is unsure of what his responsibility is, he (at least partially) learns this
from the observation of others’ behavior.
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Can Monetary Incentives Enhance Educational Outcomes?
It may seem that designing incentive mechanisms to improve education should be relatively
unambiguous. Students may invest too little effort in their own education because they
overly discount the future, have time-inconsistent preferences, or underestimate the return
on education. Monetary incentives can then provide immediate returns that provide an extra
motivation to study. Similarly, incentives can give parents and teachers additional reasons to
put more effort into educating children or simply making sure the kids go to school (Glewwe,
Ilias, and Kremer, 2010).
However, monetary incentives may crowd out other underlying reasons for educational de-
cisions. Kohn (1999) refers to incentives provided in education as “bribes". He shows that
while manipulating people with incentives seems to work in the short run,11 it is a strategy
that ultimately fails and even does lasting harm. Kohn demonstrates that people actually do
inferior work when they are enticed with money, grades, or other incentives. “The more we
use artificial inducements to motivate people, the more they lose interest in what we’re brib-
ing them to do. Parents and teachers who care about helping students to learn, meanwhile,
should be doing everything possible to help them forget that grades exist".12
Experimental evidence provides important insights about when such incentives are more
likely to work. In particular, the empirical evidence shows that incentives work well in in-
creasing attendance and enrollment and they have mixed results on effort and achieve-
ments.
Regarding the incentives in attendance and enrollment, the program Progresa in Mexico is
an example (Behrman, Sengupta, and Todd, 2005; Schultz, 2004). This program covered the
high opportunity costs of sending kids to school for the poor families. The program paid on
average 55$ per month (over one-fifth of the average family income) for families whose chil-
dren attended school. The evaluation of the first years of the program show earlier ages of
school entry, less grade repetition, better grade progression, lower drop-out rates, and higher
school reentry among drop-outs. Particularly noteworthy are the reduction of drop-out rates
during the transition from primary to secondary school, and that grade progression occurred
even from younger children who do not receive educational incentives through the program.
This last finding suggests a forward-looking behavior on the part of the parents.
Therefore, the evaluation of programs using incentives to reward enrollment and school at-
tendance is positive. This is due to specific characteristic of the programs. More specifically,
the programs offer incentives for concrete tasks. Students either attend school and receive
the reward, or not. These programs do not involve a complicated objective that students may
11Promising gifts to children for good behavior can never produce anything more than temporary obedience
(Kohn, 1999).
12Many educators believe paying students is morally wrong. They argue that one of the goals of schools is to
increase the importance of intrinsic motivation.
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not know how to achieve, and neither there are difficulties in measuring and rewarding the
achievement of the objective. Furthermore, incentives are offered to families and not to the
children specifically, and thus the incentives do not directly affect the motivation of those
being educated. In this way, the possibility that children may substitute their desire to learn
for their desire to receive the reward is of less concern.
Compared with the evidence on attendance and enrollment, the evidence on incentives of-
fered for academic performance is more mixed and depends on the characteristics of the
task being rewarded. Bettinger (2010) shows that to give direct incentives for higher grades in
primary schools in Coshocton, Ohio, increased math scores but not those of other subjects,
such as reading or social science. One possible interpretation of these results, compatible
with research in psychology, suggests external incentives may be more effective in concrete
subjects, such as primary school math, than in more conceptual topics, such as reading and
social sciences (Rouse, 1998). This can also mean that incentives seem to work well for some
students but not for others.
In conclusion, monetary incentives seem to have moderate success when the incentives are
well-specified and well-targeted (“read these books" rather than “read books"), and a prin-
cipal (the government, for example) has to be very careful when designing the incentives to
prevent adverse changes in children’s behavior.
1.4 Incentives in the Selection of Motivated Employees
Another related topic is the self-selection of motivated employees in different sectors. It is
often argued that preferences and work motivations of employees differ depending by the
nature of the jobs. Many jobs involve helping people in need or contributing to society at
large, delivering these jobs attractive to people who have a strong willingness to serve others
or the public interest (see Buurman, Dur and Van den Bossche, 2009).
There is a large literature that suggests that employees want more than just monetary com-
pensation for their work and they differ in their intrinsic motivation (see for example Fran-
cois, 2004, Besley and Ghatak, 2005, and Prendergast, 2007). Most articles in this literature
are principally focused on working relationship between the public and private sectors and
on the matching of employees with different motivation in different sectors.
Besley and Ghatak (2005) emphasize the importance of the precise definition of the target of
a public sector institution in increasing organizational efficiency. They find that it is possi-
ble to achieve a perfect matching between workers and firms in which motivated employees
work in the non-profit sectors making their preferred projects. In this case, motivated indi-
viduals improve their levels of effort, even if they receive a low compensation for that. They
conclude that monetary incentives are likely to be lower-powered in the non-profit than in
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the for-profit firms.
The use of high powered incentives in the public or non-profit sector has long been question-
able. For example, Holmström and Milgrom (1991) argue that that if an employee performs
several tasks and it is not easy measure how well these tasks are performed, then introduc-
ing monetary incentives is not always efficient as such incentives are often associated with
less effort and less attention being placed on tasks of high social value. They emphasize the
distinction between output and the agent’s measured performance. In general, it is shown
that if the principal wishes the agent to allocate effort towards a task that is not easily mea-
surable then incentives on the measurable tasks must be weakened. When the agent has an
outside task option, optimal incentives are also weaker the more that effort is substitutable
between outside and inside tasks. Holmström and Milgrom further describe how the subset
of tasks performed within an individual job and the method of pay for that job, are jointly
determined. It is predicted that subsets of tasks will be grouped around the costs of measur-
ing and rewarding performance. Some workers will perform a set of easy to measure tasks
and will be paid based on measured performance. Others will perform a set of difficult to
measure tasks and will receive a fixed wage. A good example is teaching. Teachers have the
choice of whether to invest in effort that will improve the test scores of students or effort that
gives students other skills such as inquisitiveness and curiosity whose performance is diffi-
cult to measure. The authors argue that if teachers are given incentive pay based on exam
performance then they will exert less of the second type of effort. Thus, the overall outcome
of incentive pay may be an undesirable one and it could simply be a first best option to of-
fer teachers a flat salary. The clear implication of this article is that a performance related
pay scheme should be used less in jobs that involve many, complex or difficult-to-measure
tasks.13 However, they do not consider the case in which individuals can be intrinsically
motivated. Intrinsically motivated teachers could have less incentive to shirk either type of
effort.
In a related paper by Francois (2004), he analyzes selection into production of a public good.
It is assumed that a single firm has a large pool of potential applicants to choose from. The
workers differ in their valuation of the public good, and their motivation is purely outcome
related. The main purpose of the paper is to compare performance-based pay with a flat-
rate salary. If payment is made conditional on delivery, only individuals with motivation
13Dixit (1997) extends Holmström and Milgrom’s (1991) bilateral multi-tasking model to the case where sev-
eral principals contract with a single agent over a range of tasks. The agent’s decision rule is to choose the
optimal effort level to exert on each task according to his private costs and benefits given the full set of con-
tracts. When the principals collude to provide a single contract to the agent, the same result is found as in
the Holmström-Milgrom model. When the principals cannot collude however, each principal sets a reward
schedule that is privately optimal given each of the other principal’s reward schedules and the agent’s optimal
decision rule. But the lack of collusion leads to a negative externality weakening incentives relative to the col-
lusive case. The implication of this work is that providing incentives for a government agent to act in alignment
with the social optimum is more costly when his reward depends on satisfying several non-collusive principals.
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above a certain cutoff value will apply for the position, and these individuals will also de-
liver. When a salary is used, the situation is more complex. A contract offered will typically
attract two types of applicants: shirkers, who have a very low valuation of the public good,
and those who have a particularly high valuation of the good. One interesting point is that
it is not straightforward to derive the comparative statics for how these two cutoff points
change when the salary is increased: it depends on the distribution of worker types. Due to
this ambiguity, it is not possible to determine whether performance-related pay or salaries
are preferred without putting further restrictions on the distribution of types. However, total
output will not be very sensitive to salaries: an increase in wages causes an influx of commit-
ted workers, but also more shirkers find it worthwhile to work for the higher salary. For this
reason, wages will be lower in the public sector.
In Prendergast (2007), many individuals are motivated to exert effort because they care about
their jobs, rather than because there are monetary consequences to their actions. He as-
sumes that workers differ in altruism for clients and shows that government prefers to at-
tract different workers types for different agencies. Moreover, he shows that, when agents’
types are not observable, agencies are likely to attract both the most preferred and the least
preferred workers.
A key prediction of this literature is that we should observe relatively low pay and weak mon-
etary incentives in jobs with high degree of individuals’ intrinsic motivation, as these lead to
self-selection of job applicants with high motivation. Furthermore, this literature suggests
that the public sector pays lower monetary incentives than the private sector to attract mo-
tivated employees.
1.4.1 Career Concerns or Implicit Incentives
The theory of the incentives generated by career concerns, or implicit incentives, has been
relatively overlooked in relation to the large literature on explicit incentives generated, within
firms, by alternative methods of pay. The central idea behind implicit incentives is that the
worker exerts effort in order to influence the market’s beliefs about his talent. Thus even
when an employee is paid a fixed wage, he may be motivated by the effect his effort has on
future wages.
Holmström (1982) presents a model in which wages depend on expected productivity which
is a function of observed performance in previous periods. This creates an “implicit con-
tract" linking contemporaneous performance to future wages. There are two parties in the
model: the market and the worker. Both are assumed to know the distribution of talent
across workers, the distribution of noise in the production process and the worker’s optimal
decision rule. When talent is fixed, the firm sequentially infers a more precise belief about
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the worker’s talent with each observation on output. The more precise is the firms belief,
the less incentive there is for the worker to exert effort. As the number of observations be-
comes large, optimal effort tends towards zero. When there is no uncertainty, there is no
effect of effort on beliefs and hence no effort will be exerted. This extreme result depends on
the initial assumption that talent is fixed. Then, Holmström assumes that talent evolves over
time due to effects such as learning by doing; this introduces extra uncertainty about talent
at every observation on output. In this case, the precision of the market’s belief about an
agent’s talent tends to a constant state where the learning through observations on output
exactly offsets the talent shocks. This is associated with a positive optimal level of effort for
the worker.
Two key results are generated from this model. First, career concerns are more effective if
the evolution of talent is more stochastic or if the observations on output are more accurate.
The former captures the intuition that when there is more uncertainty about how potentially
talented he is, an employee will work harder since his effort has a stronger impact on future
wages by influencing this belief. The more accurate are the observations on output the larger
is the return on effort in a single period since more will be inferred by the market as a result of
each observation. The second key result is that, assuming that the precision of the markets
belief on talent converges upwards to its stationary state, effort levels converge monotoni-
cally downwards to their stationary state. That is, young workers will work harder than older
workers since they are more able to establish a reputation through effort when the market’s
information is more diffuse as it is thought to be for younger workers. This result also holds
intuitive appeal.
The nature of incentives generated through career concerns may be particularly important
in the public sector. Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (1999) extend Holmström’s model (1982)
by including multiple tasks and analyze the incentives of government agency officials. Of
particular motivation to their analysis are a set of observations by Wilson (1989). Wilson
stresses three key differences between government agencies and private firms. The first is
the preponderance of career concerns over financial incentives facing government officials.
Second, the objectives of the government agency are often unclear and, third, they often op-
erate with limited autonomy in relation to private firms. Wilson also notes that successful
government agencies have a clear focus on a specific mission. A formal analysis using the
multitask career concerns model generates a set of results consistent with these observa-
tions. It is derived that expanding the set of tasks pursued by the worker typically reduces
total effort. This is because the link from performance to the market’s inference about talent
becomes weaker with more tasks. Uncertainty over the nature of tasks pursued by the worker
or the effort allocation between them is also shown to reduce total effort.
These two results taken together support the observation by Wilson that successful agencies
pursue a narrow and clear mission. They also lend support to the idea that hiring profes-
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sionals who focus on a specific task can be relied upon for greater effort than a generalist
bureaucrat and should receive more autonomy. One of the key insights from this literature is
that there is scope for improving performance in the public sector simply through organiza-
tional design. Improving the clarity of missions and allocating a minimal number of tasks to
public sector officials may substantially improve incentives via individuals’ concern for their
careers and clarity of goals.
1.5 Conclusions
In this overview, I have studied the impact of intrinsic motivation on the individuals’ behav-
ior. In particular, I have considered the case in which individuals contribute to a public good.
In this case, models that consider individuals’ intrinsic motivation provide better predictions
than standard models based on the self-interest assumption, as many experiments show.
However, even if the individuals’ intrinsic motivation has a positive impact on the levels of
contribution, the Pareto efficient allocation is not always achieved. Then, the intervention of
a principal is needed. The principal can offer different incentives to different types of agents
in order to elicit higher levels of effort. I have studied the impact of monetary incentives
on the individual choice when the individuals have different degrees of intrinsic motivation.
Furthermore, I have investigated how monetary incentives can reduce the individuals’ per-
formance under some circumstances. In education, for example, monetary incentives seem
to have moderate success when the incentives are well-specified and well-targeted (“read
these books" rather than “read books") but they may crowd out other underlying reasons
for educational decisions. Moreover, monetary incentives can signal distrust or difficulty of
achieving a specific goal.
Another related topic is the self-selection of motivated employees between public and pri-
vate sector. Intrinsically motivated individuals exert a given level of effort even in the ab-
sence of a monetary compensation for that and this leads to self-selection of job applicants
with high motivation. This literature also suggests that the public sector offers lower incen-
tives than the private sector to attract motivated employees.
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1.6 Appendix A
The marginal rate of substitution τJ represents the individual willingness to pay for the pub-
lic good. Let ∂U
J (q J ,Q)
∂q J1
be the marginal utility of the numeraire for member J , i.e. the first
private good, the member J ’s marginal willingness to pay for an additional unit of the public




















































where λA and λB are the Langrange multipliers of the respective budget constraints. An in-
equality becomes an equality for any private or public good which is positively consumed.
Furthermore, the price of the numeraire is equal to 1, i.e. p = 1.
Proof. Follow directly by doing the first order conditions of the optimization problem of in-
dividual A and of individual B with respect to the numeraire and the public goods.
1.6.1 Proof of Proposition 1.1.
Proof. In both cases, each individual maximizes a strictly concave utility function under lin-
ear constraints.
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≤λB (τAk (q A,Q)+τBk (qB ,Q)) ≤λB Pk
As one of the two conditions (1.17) and (1.18) must hold with equality, we have that
τAk (q
A,Q)+τBk (qB ,Q) = Pk (1.19)
as k was arbitrary, this holds for every public good.
When (1.14) and (1.16) hold with equality, I obtain analogous results to the previous case.
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Then, βA represents the ratio of member B ’s marginal valuation for a unit increase of the
numeraire quantity for member A (which enters the object function V B through U A) rela-
tive to his marginal valuation for the same increase of the numeraire quantity for his own
(which enters V B through U B ). Likewise, βB represents the ratio of A’s marginal valuation
for a unit increase of the numeraire quantity for B relative to her marginal valuation for the
same quantity increase for her own. These parameters capture the degree of caring at the
equilibrium allocation.
Substituting the values of these parameters in the equations (1.20) and (1.21), I obtain the
following:
τAk (q
A,Q A)+βAβBτBk (qB ,QB ) ≤ Pk (1.22)
and
βAβBτAk (q
A,Q A)+τBk (qB ,QB ) ≤ Pk (1.23)
Then, one of these two conditions must hold with equality and I obtain the result in propo-
sition 1.
max{τAk (q
A,Q)+βBβAτBk (qB ,Q),τBk (qB ,Q)+βAβBτAk (q A,Q)} = Pk (1.24)
I have shown that taking the first order condition for a household equilibrium with degree of
caring β ∈ [0,1], it coincides with the Lindahl-Bowen-Samuelson Condition when βA =βB =
1 for any k and with a Nash Equilibrium of the game with voluntary contributions to public
goods when βA =βB = 0 for any k.
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Chapter 2
Incentive Design for Motivated Agents in a
Public Good Problem
I develop a multi-agent model where the individuals are the agents who are asked to contribute
to the public good. The individuals may be interested not only in their own utility but also in the
well-being of the others. Namely, individuals may or may not be intrinsically motivated. Whether
they are motivated or not is their private information. I investigate the possibility of implement-
ing a mechanism compatible with individual incentives that simultaneously results in efficient
decisions, the voluntary participation of the individuals, and the feasibility of the budget. Under
asymmetric information on the individuals’ intrinsic motivation, the principal has to offer differ-
ent transfers to different agents in order to attain separation of types. The transfers are made as
a function of their degree of motivation. Both individuals will be taxed but motivated individuals
pay lower taxes than unmotivated individuals. This is because the principal pays an information
rent to motivated individuals in order to elicit higher levels of effort. Monetary incentives are
necessary to compensate motivated individuals in order to increase the levels of contribution.
Keywords: Intrinsic Motivation, Caring Preferences, Public Good Problem, Incomplete Informa-
tion.
2.1 Introduction
Intrinsic motivation alone may be not sufficient to supply the socially optimal level of con-
tribution in a public good problem. Then, the intervention of a principal is needed. The
intervention usually takes the form of monetary incentives such as payments or regulations.
Payments may be used to subsidize contributions, whereas regulations to mandate a mini-
mum contribution.
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If each individual’s preferences are publicly known, the principal can easily implement the
efficient level of public-good provision in so improving the outcome under voluntary pro-
vision. If preferences are private information, the principal has to elicit the information
needed to approach the optimum. Because this information has to come from the individ-
uals who hold it, the question is how to give these individuals incentives to properly reveal
this information.
I consider a principal-agent model in which individuals contribute to the public good by ex-
erting costly effort. The principal-agent relationship can be interpreted as the relationship
between the government that delegates the decision of contribution to a public good to the
individuals (the agents). The principal can motivate individuals through a tax-subsidy sys-
tem.
As said, in this model individuals provide a non-monetary contribution. In general, provi-
sion of public goods may be accomplished either monetarily or by exerting effort. For exam-
ple, when the walls of a community center need to be painted, the citizenry either decides to
work together to paint the walls themselves or collects money to hire someone to do the job.
There are many other examples of non-monetary contributions. For instance, consider the
household recycling activities in which the individuals contribute by exerting effort in order
to improve environmental quality.
The key assumption of my model is that individuals may have caring preferences.1 More
specifically, they may care not only about their personal interest but also about the well-
being of the others.2 There are only two types of (male) agents: self-interested agents and
motivated agents. In contrast, individuals have the same valuation of the public good.
The principal may not have information on the type of agent that contributes to the public
good. I investigate the possibility of finding a mechanism which fulfills some desirable re-
quirements. Specifically, the implementation of the efficient decisions compatible with the
incentives and the voluntary participation of the individuals that satisfy the feasibility of the
budget (taxes plus subsidies less or equal than zero).3
With perfect information, the principal does not have to offer an incentive to the individuals
because it has all the necessary information to implement the efficient levels of contribu-
tion. More specifically, the principal offers a transfer which just covers the cost of effort in-
curred by the agent minus his direct benefit deriving from directly enjoying the public good
and the indirect benefit tied to his intrinsic motivation. In this case, both individuals will be
taxed. This is because both individuals obtain higher marginal benefits than marginal costs.
1These preferences are able to explain altruism, empathy and responsibility towards the others.
2Most economic models have shown that individuals can be affected by fairness, equity and altruistic con-
siderations (see for example Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). For instance, lots of people invest time and money in
improving the environment and supporting activities that are costly to themselves and mostly benefit others.
3This chapter is related to the works by Arrow (1979) and d’Aspremont and Gèrard-Varet (1979). The mecha-
nism proposed by Arrow (1979) and d’Aspremont and Gèrard-Varet (1979) satisfies the budget balancing prop-
erty but need not be individually rational.
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In addition, motivated individuals pay higher taxes than selfish individuals. The economic
intuition behind this result is the following: motivated individuals provide a given level of
effort for a higher taxation. The principal extracts all the surplus of the public good through
taxation.
With asymmetric information, a motivated agent benefits from pretending to be a low type.
The principal gives up information rents in order to induce separation of types. The transfers
are made as a function of their degree of motivation. In this case, the taxes paid by motivated
individuals are lower than in the first-best. Monetary incentives are necessary to compen-
sate the motivated individuals in order to elicit higher levels of effort and to increase the
levels of contribution. In contrast, unmotivated individuals pay the same amount of taxes
under first-best and second-best. Furthermore, motivated individuals pay lower taxes than
unmotivated individuals. This result stands in contrast to the previous literature in which
motivation is effective in stimulating work effort even in the absence of monetary incentives
(see for example Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000a,b and Benabou and Tirole, 2003, 2006).4
I show that under asymmetric information with respect to the individuals’ intrinsic motiva-
tion the total amount of taxes paid by the individuals is reduced. This is because the princi-
pal pays a rent to motivated individuals in order to increase the levels of contribution. This
result is obtained at the expenses of an increase in the decision inefficiency: the total level
of contribution is lower than the first-best total level of contribution. Motivated individuals
contribute more than in the first-best, while the unmotivated individuals contribute less.
This article is related to the literature on contribution games for Peer-to-Peer Networks (see
for example Ballester, Calvó-Armengol and Zenou, 2006, and Corbo, Calvó-Armengol and
Parkes, 2006). This literature investigates how individuals provide public goods when there
are externalities from other individuals’ play. I share with this literature the complementar-
ities among the levels of effort exerted by the individuals. However, they do not consider
differences in the individuals’ preferences.
The plan of the chapter is as follows: in section 2.2 I present the general framework of the
model; section 2.3 is devoted to the analysis of the results under asymmetric information;
and concluding remarks are offered in section 2.4.
4This literature shows that monetary incentives can influence negatively the individuals’ behavior in terms
of their levels of contribution. The reason is that monetary incentives give the agent a selfish motive to oper-
ate. Explicit incentives from principals may change how tasks are perceived by agents (Gneezy and Rustichini,
2000a) and they may also reduce the value of generous or civic minded acts as a signal of one’s moral character
(Benabou and Tirole, 2003, 2006).
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2.2 The model
2.2.1 The Set-Up of the Model
I develop a principal-agent model between a principal and two agents, A and B . The principal-
agent relationship can be interpreted as the relationship between the government who del-
egates the decision of contribution to a public good to the individuals (the agents).
The principal’s utility function is given by:
Ω=−(tA + tB ), (2.1)
where tA and tB are the transfers given respectively to agent A and to agent B . These trans-
fers can be positive or negative depending on the individuals’ levels of contribution. The
transfers are feasible if tA + tB ≤ 0.5
In order to provide the public good, the agents have to exert effort and incur in a quadratic
cost 12 g
2
J with J = A,B . The individuals care not only about their own contribution but also
about the contribution provided by the others. This is because the levels of contribution of
each individual can affect the marginal benefit of others’ individual contributions. The mea-
sure of this benefit depends on the parameter θJ that represents their valuation of the public
good and it is strictly positive.
In addition, the agents’ utility might positively depend on the benefits that the other indi-
vidual obtains. The measure of this utility depends on the parameter α that represents the
intrinsic motivation of the agent. There are only two types of agents: the self-interested
agents with α= 0 and the motivated agents with α> 0. The participation of the individuals
is voluntary.
The utility of the individual A is given by the following:









and the utility of the individual B is represented by:









where f (g A, gB ) is an increasing, concave and twice continuously differentiable production
function with f (0,0) = 0. To obtain an explicit solution, the function will take the following
form: f (g A, gB ) =pg A gB . This function considers the complementarity among the levels of
effort exerted by the individuals (as shown in Ballester, Calvó-Armengol and Zenou, 2006,
and Corbo, Calvó-Armengol and Parkes, 2006).
The utility of each agent consists of a part depending on his own “egoistic" utility and a part
5In this case, the principal obtains a benefit by the provision of the public good.
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depending on the utility of the other individual. In this construction, αA =αB = 0 stands for
egoistic preferences in which each agent cares only about his own benefit from the contribu-
tion to the public good. In contrast, α> 0 stands for caring preferences in which each agent
cares also about the benefit obtained by the other agent. If αA = αB = 1 the two individuals
care a lot about each other and their preferences coincide, i.e. VA =VB .
In the following sections, I analyze the case in which the principal has perfect information
on the agents’ intrinsic motivation and the case in which it has not (αJ with J = A,B can be
not observable and not contractible by the principal).
The timing of the game is as follows. At the initial stage 0, agents are informed about their
type; at stage 1, the principal offers a menu of contracts consisting of the individuals’ levels
of contribution and the individuals’ transfers; at stage 2, the agents decide whether to par-
ticipate or not. If they decide to participate, they choose their contributions simultaneously,
which are then observed by the principal; finally, at stage 3, transfers are collected and the
public good is provided.
2.2.2 The Benchmark Case
I study the optimal mechanism when the government intervenes. It adopts incentives in
presence of a public goods problem, in which the level of contribution of each individual
can affect the marginal benefit of other individuals’ contributions.
With perfect information, the principal need not offer an incentive to the individuals be-
cause it has all the necessary information to implement the efficient levels of contribution.
The transfer will just cover the cost of effort incurred by the agent minus his direct benefit





























The transfer makes each agent indifferent between accepting and rejecting the contract,
given the required effort to contribute.6 Regarding the transfers, it is possible to note that
a high θJ with J = A,B reduces them. This means that agents with a high valuation of the
public good receive lower incentive pay at the optimum. Take, for instance, θB > θA. In this
case, the principal will offer a bigger transfer to individual A who is less interested to the
public good than individual B . This is because the more involved individual contributes to
6The principal offers a transfer to each agent which makes them at least as well off as their outside option.
The outside option of the agent in the absence of contribution is normalized to zero.
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the provision even if he receive a low compensation. The economic intuition behind this
result is the following: if agents care more about the public good, there will be less need to use
transfers and to distort the outcome away from efficiency. In other words, the principal will
offer a higher transfer to the agent with a low valuation and a lower transfer to the agent with
a high valuation. Analogously, if the egoistic utilities are positive, the principal will offer a
bigger transfer to the less motivated individual.
Under complete information the individuals’ efficient levels of contribution are obtained by
equating the government’s marginal value to the sum of individuals’ marginal cost. This re-
sult will coincide with the one obtained when the government is a “benevolent principal"
who maximizes the social welfare. So the government maximizes the following:
Ω= [(1+αA)θB + (1+αB )θA]pg A gB − 1
2
[
(1+αB )g 2A + (1+αA)g 2B
]
(2.6)
Henceforth, I focus on the case in which the individuals are homogeneous in their valuation
of the public good, i.e. θA = θB = θ. Applying the first order condition to equation (2.6) with
respect to g A and gB , the first-best levels of contribution are represented by the following
two equations:
g∗A =





θ[(1+αA)9/4(1+αB )3/4](2+αA +αB )
2(1+αA)3(1+αB )
(2.8)
The left-hand side is the private marginal cost of contributing and the right-hand side is the
marginal benefit of contributing to the public good. This marginal benefit consists of the
marginal benefit due to the individuals’ valuation of public good and to their intrinsic mo-
tivation. As usual, the first-best induces the agents to exert the level of contribution that
maximizes the the social welfare. Hence, the resulting contribution levels are socially opti-
mal.7
Proposition 2.1. If αA =αB =α g∗A = g∗B = θ. In contrast, if αA ̸=αB and αA >αB g∗A > g∗B .
Proof. By substituting in equations (2.7) and (2.8) αA and αB with α, I obtain the following:
g∗ = θ[(1+α)
9











[(1+αB )9/4(1+αA)3/4](1+αA)3(1+αB ) > [(1+αA)9/4(1+αB )3/4](1+αB )3(1+αA)
After some computations, it is easy to see that the inequality holds if αA >αB .
7Since the participation constraints bind regardless of the agents’ type, the principal extracts all the surplus
above the agents’ reservation utility, and therefore it has the incentive to maximize it.
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If both individuals are also homogeneous in their degree of motivation, i.e. αA = αB = α,
the optimal levels of contributions correspond to their valuation of the public good, i.e.
g∗A = g∗B = θ.
In contrast, when the degree of intrinsic motivation is different among individuals, i.e. αA ̸=
αB , the individual with the highest α increases his contribution. In contrast, the individual
with lowest α reduces his contribution.8 This is because an increase of the individual degree
of motivation has a positive impact on his own level of contribution.9 While it has a nega-
tive effect on the level of contribution of the other individual.10 Obviously, the effect of their
valuation of the public good on the levels of contribution is positive for both individuals, i.e.
∂g A
∂θ > 0 and
∂gB
∂θ > 0. Individuals that value more the public good are willing to exert higher
levels of effort.
Substituting the levels of contribution provided into equations (2.4) and (2.5), I obtain the
optimal levels of transfers:
































Proposition 2.2. t∗A, t
∗
B < 0 for any values of θ > 0 and α ∈ [0,1]. If αA > αB t∗A < t∗B < 0. In
words, individual A will be taxed more.
Proof. I want to show that both individuals are always taxed, i.e. t∗A, t
∗
B < 0 for any values of
θ > 0 and α ∈ [0,1]. The proof unfolds in two steps. First, I study the marginal effect of the
degree of motivation α on the optimal levels of transfers. Secondly, I show that the above
inequality holds also in a limit case and this completes the proof.
Deriving equations (2.9) and (2.10) with respect to αA, αB , I obtain that the effect of these
8If I consider the extreme case in which the individual A is highly motivated, i.e. αA = 1, and the individual
B is selfish, i.e. αB = 0, the optimal levels of contribution are the following: g∗A = 1.26θ and g∗B = 0.89θ.













4 (2+αA +αB )
2(1+αA)2(1+αB )3
> 0
if αA > 13 (αB −2). This inequality always holds true. The objective functions of the individuals are symmetric.
Then, I also have that ∂gB∂αB > 0.








+ 9θ(2+αA +αB )




4 (2+αA +αB )
2(1+αA)(1+αB )4
< 0
if αB < 2+3αA . This inequality always holds true. Then, I also have ∂gB∂αA < 0.
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variables on the transfers is negative, i.e. ∂t J
∂αA
< 0 and ∂t J
∂αB
< 0 with J = A,B . Moreover, I
obtain the same result regarding the impact of the valuation θ, i.e. ∂t J∂θ < 0. If agents are
motivated and/or have a high valuation of the public good, there will be less need to use
transfers and to distort the outcome away from efficiency.
Then, I consider a limit case in which both individuals are selfish, i.e. αA =αB = 0. Since the
impact of motivation on the transfers is negative, if the individuals will be taxed in this limit
case, they will be always taxed for higher values of these parameters. If both individuals are
selfish, the transfers are equal to tA = tB =−12θ2.11
This result is due to the fact that the benefit of contributing to the public good are higher than
the cost of contributing. Then, individuals are always taxed and more motivated individuals
pay higher taxes. There is no budget-balance: tA + tB ̸= 0. However, the transfers are feasible.
2.3 Implementation of the second best
In the second best, the individuals’ caring parameters are their private information. For sim-
plicity, I assume that αJ with J = A,B can take only two values: αJ = 0 and αJ > 0. In contrast,
the valuation of the public good is common knowledge with θA = θB = θ > 0.
The principal will offer different contracts designed for different types. The offered transfer
will depend on the contribution of the agent himself, i.e. t J (g J ). Under asymmetric informa-
tion, the motivated agent has an advantage to pretend to be low type. To induce separation
of types, the principal will pay an information rent to the motivated agent. The magnitude
of these rents will be crucially affected by the parameter of asymmetric information α.
I will compare the levels of contribution of the agents and the rents offered to them with the
benchmark case in order to see how the asymmetric information on the caring parameters
and the heterogeneity of α among individuals have an impact on the individuals’ choice in
terms of contribution. In addition, I will investigate when the principal would make more or
less use of monetary incentives under asymmetric information on the degree of caring.
The asymmetric information with respect to the individuals’ intrinsic motivation reduces
the total amount of taxes paid by the individuals with respect to the first-best. This result is
obtained at the expenses of an increase in the decision inefficiency: the total level of contri-
bution is lower than the first-best total level of contribution.
11If both individuals are highly motivated, i.e. αA = αB = 1, the transfers are equal to tA = tB = −2θ2. This
is also true when individuals are heterogenous in their motivation. Moreover, more motivated individuals pay
higher taxes. If only individual A is highly intrinsically motivated, while the individual B is self-interested, the
optimal transfers will be equal to: tA =−1.72θ2 and tB =−0.659θ2.
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2.3.1 Asymmetric Information on the Degree of Caring
In this subsection, I present the case in which the individuals’ caring parameter is their pri-
vate information. There are only two types of individuals: self-interested agents αJ = 0 and
motivated agents αJ > 0.12 In contrast, the valuation of the public good is common knowl-
edge and strictly positive for both individuals, i.e. θA = θB > 0.
The agent A does not know if the agent B is low-type or high-type. The conditional proba-
bility distribution for the individual A is as follows:
µ= Pr (αB =αB |αA =αA) = Pr (αB =αB |αA =αA);
(1−µ) = Pr (αB =αB |αA =αA) = Pr (αB =αB |αA =αA).
Then, the conditional probability of having individuals of the same type is equal to µ, while
that of having individuals of different type is 1−µ.13 I assume µ ≥ 12 . This means that the
probability of having individuals of the same type is higher or equal than the probability of
having individuals of different type.
The principal offers different contract schemes to the agents depending on their levels of









−t A(g A)− t B (g B )− t A(g A)− t B (g B )
]
(2.11)
subject to incentives and non negative participation constraints. The incentive constraints
require that is a Bayesian equilibrium for each agent to report her type truthfully. While par-
ticipation constraints require that each type of each agent have to be at least as well off by
participating as they would be by not participating in the contribution of the public good.
Given that the mechanism is voluntary, the individual choice must not only induce truthful
revelation of information but must also satisfy the participation constraints. I assume that
the outside options are exogenously given and normalized to zero.
I can simplify the number of relevant constraints. As usual, I obtain that the incentive con-
straint for the α-agent is binding (because the difficulty comes from a α-agent willing to
claim that he is inefficient rather than the reverse). Under complete information the mo-
tivated individual pays higher taxes. Under asymmetric information, this individual can
pretend to be low type. The principal has to offer him an incentive to reveal his type. In
contrast, the participation constraint for the α-agent is the binding one (because if a menu
12I made this assumption only to simplify the computation but my results do not change qualitatively if both
parameters are between 0 and 1.
13In probability theory, the conditional probability of αA given αB is the probability of αA if αB is known to
occur (or have occurred). Mathematically, it is defined for Pr (αB ) ̸= 0 as Pr (αA |αB ) = Pr (αA ∩αB )/Pr (αB ). In
my case, µ = Pr (αA ∩αB )/Pr (αB ) where the Pr (αB ) = 12 (the probability to extract between the low and the
high type). Then, Pr (αA ∩αB ) = µ2 . Given that it is simple to compute the other probabilities.
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of contracts enables a unmotivated agent to reach his status quo utility level, it will be also
the case for a motivated one). All the mathematical computations and the proof of the main
results are showed in the Appendix A.
Using the participation constraints and the incentive constraints, the optimal transfers will


































and the following equations if the individuals are high-type:
t A = 1
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g 2A − (1+αA)θ[µ
√
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= R : Information Rent
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]︸ ︷︷ ︸
= R : Information Rent
(2.13)
The transfer offered to the α-agent has to cover his cost of exerting effort and he does not
earn any information rent. While the α-agent obtain an information rent R. This rent is
obtained through the amount contributed by the individuals.
Substituting the transfers in the principal’s utility and doing the first order condition, I obtain
the following system of equations:




















with J = A,B .
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Solving the system of equations simultaneously and setting µ = 12 14, I obtain the following
result:
Proposition 2.3. Let (g∗SBJ , g
∗SB
J
) with J = A,B be an equilibrium where individuals value
positively the public good, i.e. θ > 0, and there is asymmetric information on the degree of
caring:
• g∗SBJ > g∗J and g∗SBJ < g
∗
J
for any values of α> 0.
Proof. It is shown in the Appendix B.
The motivated individual contributes more than under complete information, while the un-
motivated individual contributes less. This result is shown in figure 2.1. In the first graph,
there is the comparison between the levels of contribution of the motivated individual under
complete and incomplete information. The blue line represents his levels of contribution in
the first-best, while the purple line the levels of contribution in the second-best. The blue
line is always below the purple line. In the second graph, I compare the levels of contribution
of the unmotivated individual under complete and incomplete information. The blue line
represents his levels of contribution under first-best, while the purple his levels of contribu-
tion under second-best. The blue line is always above the purple line. Furthermore, if the
The levels of contribution
of the motivated agent
in the second-best.
The levels of contribution
of the motivated agent
in the first-best.








The levels of contribution
of the unmotivated agent
in the first-best.
The levels of contribution
of the unmotivated agent
in the second-best.








Figure 2.1: Comparison on the levels of contribution when α= 1 and µ= 12 .
individuals are heterogeneous (an individual is motivated, while the other is selfish) the total
level of contribution obtained under asymmetric information is lower than the total level of
14I consider µ = 12 to simplify the computations. However, the result in the proposition 2.3 still holds for
higher values of µ.
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contribution obtained under complete information. There is in other words inefficiency on
the decision choice.15
Substituting the levels of contribution into equations (2.12) and (2.13), I obtain the levels of
transfer in the second -best and I obtain the following result:
Proposition 2.4. t∗SBJ < t
∗SB
J < 0. Furthermore, t∗J ∼= t∗SBJ < 0 and t
∗
J < t∗SBJ < 0 for any
values of θ and α> 0.
Proof. It is shown in the Appendix B.
Under asymmetric information, the motivated agent pays lower taxes than the unmotivated
agent. This depends on the fact that a higher degree of caring has two opposite effects on the
transfer given to the motivated agent. The first effect is positive and it represents the effect of
the individual degree of caring on the marginal cost of exerting effort. A high α has a positive
impact on the information rent given to the motivated agent. The principal has to offer a
positive transfer in order to cover the cost of effort and to motivate the involved individual
by contributing efficient quantities. The second effect is negative and it represents the effect
of the caring parameter on the monetary incentive. Individuals with a high degree of caring
will be willing to exert a higher level of effort even if they receive a lower compensation or
have to pay higher taxes for that. This is because when the individual has a high caring
parameter, he could provide spontaneously high levels of effort and the principal does not
need to give them a high rent. However, the first effect dominates the second one and the
motivated individual pays lower taxes in the second-best than in the first-best.16 In contrast,
the unmotivated individual pays the same amount of taxes under first and second-best.
Hence, the total amount of taxes paid by the individuals is lower than in the benchmark case.





= 0.7θ and g∗SBA = g∗SBB = 1.36θ. It is possible to note that the highly motivated
individual contributes more than under complete information, while the unmotivated individual contributes
less. If the individual A is motivated and the individual B is selfish, the total level of contribution will be equal
to g∗SBA +g∗SBB = 1.36θ+0.7θ = 2.06θ. Under complete information, the total level of contribution was equal to
g∗A + g∗B = 1.26θ+0.89θ = 2.15θ.
16This result stands in contrast to the previous literature in which motivation is effecting in stimulating work
effort even in absence of monetary incentives.
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2.4 Conclusions
I have developed a principal-agent model in which individuals contribute to the public good
by exerting costly effort. In addition, the individuals are interested not only in their mon-
etary compensation but also in the impact of their action on the well-being of the others.
There are only two types of agent: self-interested agents and motivated agents. The degree
of individuals’ motivation could be their private information.
The main objective of this chapter was to investigate the possibility of finding a mechanism
which fulfills some desirable requirements. Specifically, the implementation of the efficient
decisions compatible with the incentives and the voluntary participation of the individuals
that satisfy the feasibility of the budget.
With complete information, the principal offers a transfer which just covers the cost of ef-
fort incurred by the (male) agent minus his direct benefit deriving from directly enjoying the
public good and the indirect benefit tied to his intrinsic motivation. In this case, both indi-
viduals are taxed because they obtain higher benefits than costs by contributing to the public
good. Furthermore, motivated individuals pay higher taxes than the unmotivated individu-
als. This is because motivated individuals exert a given level of effort even if they pay higher
taxes for that.
With incomplete information, the principal pays a rent to motivated individuals in order to
attain separation of types. In this case, I obtained the opposite result than in the first-best.
Motivated individuals pay lower taxes than selfish individuals. This is because the principal
has to reduce the taxes paid by motivated individuals in order to compensate them to elicit
higher levels of effort. Moreover, motivated individuals pay lower taxes than in the first-best,
while selfish individuals pay the same amount. Then, the total amount of taxes paid by the
individuals was reduced. This result was obtained at the expenses of an increase in the deci-
sion inefficiency.
For future research, it might be also interesting to analyze the case in which the individuals
are heterogeneous with respect to their valuation of the public good. Moreover, in my model
I have only two types of individuals but it is interesting to consider a continuum of individu-
als.
This simple mechanism leads to a new insight concerning the individuals’ contributions to
public goods, the interaction between monetary incentives and intrinsic motivation, but it
could be extended also in private organizations. In organizations, motivated agents would
improve the performance of the firm and then they would obtain a higher payment than the
unmotivated agents.
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2.5 Appendix A
2.5.1 Which constraints are binding?
I show that, as usual, the incentive constraint for the α-agent is binding. While the partici-
pation constraint for the α-agent is the binding one.
Proof. I have the following incentive and participation constraints for the individual A:
(ICH ) : t A − 1
2
g 2A + (1+αA)θ
[
µ(g A g B )
1
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(PCH ) : t A − 1
2
g 2A + (1+αA)θ
[
µ(g A g B )
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The incentive and participation constraints for the individual B are symmetric.
Let’s determine which constraints bind.
First, note that if the equations (2.15) and (2.18) are satisfied, then
t A − 1
2
g 2A + (1+αA)θ
[
µ(g A g B )
1



































The equation (2.19) reflects the fact that the type α receives more surplus from the contribu-
tion than type α. Then, the participation constraint for the individual with high-valuation:
t A − 1
2
g 2A + (1+αA)θ
[
µ(g A g B )
1





is satisfied as well. Furthermore, it will not be binding unless g = 0. In contrast, the partici-
pation constraint for the low-type must be binding.
Next, the incentive compatibility constraint for the high-type (equation 2.15) must be bind-
ing, that is:
t A = 1
2
g 2A − (1+αA)θ
[
µ(g A g B )
1
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If this incentive were not binding, the principal could increase t A slightly and keep all con-


































≥ 0 has to be satisfied.
2.6 Appendix B
2.6.1 Proof of Proposition 2.3. and 2.4.
I want to show that the levels of contribution of the motivated individuals under the second-
best are higher than the levels of contribution under the first-best, i.e. g∗SBJ − g∗J > 0. While I





Given the explicit forms of the levels of the contributions under asymmetric information are
very large, it is not immediate to see that the inequalities hold.17 For this reason, I report this
result graphically for different values of α.
In the figure 2.2, I obtain the levels of the contribution for the selfish agent when the proba-
bility to have individuals of the same type is equal to 12 . The first graph illustrates the levels
of the contribution when α= 12 , while the second graph illustrates the same when α= 1. The
blue line is the levels of the contribution in the first-best, while the second line the levels of
the contribution in the second-best. It is possible to note that the blue line is always above
the purple line. Furthermore, higher is the degree of motivation of the other individual, lower
will be the contribution of the selfish individual.
In the figure 2.3, there are the levels of the contribution for the motivated agent. Again, the
first graph illustrates the levels of the contribution when α= 12 , while the second graph illus-
trates that when α = 1. The blue line is the levels of the contribution in the first-best, while
the purple line the levels of the contribution in the second-best. It is possible to note that
the blue line is always below the purple line. Furthermore, higher is the degree of motiva-
tion, higher will be the contribution of the motivated individual. These results still hold for
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Figure 2.2: Comparison on the levels of contribution when the agent is selfish.
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Figure 2.3: Comparison on the levels of contribution when the agent is motivated.
different values of α.
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Substituting the values of the contribution when, for example, α = 1 into equations (2.12)
and (2.13), I obtain the transfers in the second-best. Comparing these transfers with the ones
obtained in the first-best, I obtain the following graphical representations for the selfish and
the motivated individual, respectively:
















Figure 2.4: Comparison on the levels of taxes.
The blue line represents the taxes paid in the first-best, while the purple line the taxes paid
in the second-best.
It is possible to note that the amount of taxes paid by selfish individuals coincide in the first
and in the second-best (first graph in figure 2.4). In contrast, motivated individuals pay lower
taxes in the second-best than in the first-best (second graph in figure 2.4).
In addition, motivated individuals pay lower taxes than the selfish individual in the second-
best.
The results still hold with different values of α.
All the simulations and comparison are checked using Mathematica and they are available
under request.
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Chapter 3
Mixed Duopoly with Motivated Teachers
I study whether the presence of motivated teachers benefits public and private schools in a com-
petitive environment. The quality is influenced by the effort exerted by the teachers. Teachers’
motivation may have a positive impact on the levels of effort and, then, on the quality. The effect
of motivation strictly depends on the degree of differentiation of the programmes offered by the
two schools. When both schools offer similar programmes, the Nash equilibrium is the one in
which both schools hire motivated teachers. This is because teachers’ motivation plays an im-
portant role in the students’ choice between the two school. In contrast, when the two schools
offer significantly different programmes, the Nash equilibrium is the one in which both schools
hire selfish teachers. The increase in the students’ utility due to the higher quality provided by the
motivated teachers is more than offset by the reduction in the profits earned by the two schools.
Keywords: Intrinsic Motivation, Mixed Duopoly, School Choice, Hotelling Model.
3.1 Introduction
It is often argued that preferences and work motivation of employees differ depending on
the nature of the jobs. Many jobs involve helping people in need or contributing to society
at large, making these jobs attractive to people who have a strong willingness to serve the
others or the public interest (see Buurman, Dur and Van den Bossche, 2009). An appropri-
ate example is teaching. Teachers can take satisfaction from teaching and from developing
strategies that are consistent with the best interest of the students because they believe in the
virtue of the education for the society. In this sense, teachers can be intrinsically motivated.1
1Another suitable example could be the health-care system. Doctors may be interested not only in their
monetary compensation but also in the impact of their work on the well-being of their patients (see for example
Ma, 2004).
45
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In many countries the educational services are provided by both public and private institu-
tions. This article analyzes the “market" for education by developing a model that focuses
on the interaction between the public and private educational sectors.2 The educational ser-
vices offered by schools are heterogeneous. In Italy, for example, most private schools have a
strong religious connotation3 while public schools are typically secular. Furthermore, there
is a number of foreign and international schools that are private, including American, French
and British schools. Many international schools offer bi-lingual programmes, as well as En-
glish as a Foreign Language (EFL) exams if the students’ first language is not English. Then,
private schools can be appealing to parents who want to give to their children an educa-
tion closer to the international standards. On top of that, most private schools can offer a
more caring and protective atmosphere, as well as the opportunity of additional or intensive
lessons, which some parents believe to be more conducive to learning. Parents in some of
the wealthier areas of the major cities may also send their children to a private school sim-
ply for its exclusivity. Thus, there exists some degree of horizontal differentiation between
schools.
Parents and students consider the differences in the educational services offered when they
choose between public and private schools. Another feature which is taken into account in
making the school choice is the quality of the education provided by the schools. A high
level of quality can play a crucial role in the students’ decision between different schools.
The quality is influenced by the effort exerted by the teachers. Teachers’ motivation may
have a positive impact on the levels of effort and, then, on the quality. Therefore, there exists
also some degree of vertical differentiation between schools which is endogenous and de-
pends on the incentives provided to the teachers.
The aim of this model is to investigate the impact of intrinsic motivation on the schools’ out-
come in terms of quality, price and wage in a mixed duopoly environment (see De Fraja and
Delbono, 1990, and Nett, 1993, for general reviews of the mixed oligopoly markets).
To this end, I develop an oligopolistic model where two schools are positioned at each end of
a Hotelling line. The horizontal differentiation reflects the heterogeneity of the programmes
offered by the schools. While the private school maximizes its profits, the public school max-
imizes social welfare. The social welfare is given by the sum of the students’ utility, the teach-
ers’ utility and the profits obtained by both schools. Each school consists of a principal and
an agent, both risk neutral. The principal-agent relationship can be interpreted as the rela-
tionship between the school-principal who wants to delegate the decision about an outcome
in terms of quality to a teacher (the agent).
The two schools offer imperfectly substitutable programmes and they compete against each
other on quality and prices. When the degree of substitutability is high, the schools offer
2Epple and Romano (1998) also study a model of competition between public and private schools. However,
their model stresses competition for students among public and private schools.
3Most private schools are run by religious organisations (the majority by the Jesuits).
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similar programmes and there is more competition in the market.
The key assumption of the model is that teachers can be intrinsically motivated. There are
only two types of agents: the selfish teacher and the motivated teacher.
I show that the presence of motivated teachers can benefit or hurt public and private schools
depending on the degree of differentiation between the programmes offered by the two
schools.
If the programmes offered by the schools are only slightly different and both principals hire
self-interested teachers, a principal finds it profitable to deviate by hiring a motivated teacher.
By doing so, the public principal increases the social welfare and the private principal ob-
tains a comparative advantage in terms of demand and price. Then, if a principal hires a
motivated teacher the best response of the other principal is to hire a motivated agent as
well. The Nash equilibrium is the one in which both schools hire motivated teachers. Teach-
ers’ motivation plays an important role in the students’ choice between the two schools.
Individuals’ intrinsic motivation increases the quality of the educational services offered by
both schools. To elicit higher levels of effort to increase the quality, both principals have to
offer higher incentives to their agents. Then, motivation has a positive impact on the wages
offered to the teachers. This result does not support the previous literature in which moti-
vation is effective in stimulating work effort even in absence of monetary rewards (see for
example Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000a,b and Bénabou and Tirole, 2003, 2006).4
If the schools offer very different programmes, there is less scope for competition in the mar-
ket. The private school obtains higher benefits by hiring self-interested teachers than by
hiring motivated teachers. This is because teachers’ motivation is relatively less important.
Considering the public school, the higher the degree of differentiation of the programmes
offered by the schools, the lower the utility of the students. This effect has a negative impact
on the social welfare. When the schools offer different educational programmes, there is less
competition in the market and this has a negative impact on the students’ utility reducing
social welfare. In addition, the higher the degree of differentiation of the programmes, the
higher the profits obtained by the schools. This effect has a positive impact on the social
welfare. In this case, the increase in the students’ utility due to the higher quality provided
by the motivated teachers is more than offset by the reduction in the profits earned by the
two schools. In other words, if the programmes offered by the schools are very different, the
role of agents’ intrinsic motivation is less important. Hence, the public school also hires the
selfish teacher and the students choose the school with a programme closer to their neces-
sity. The Nash equilibrium is the one in which both schools hire selfish teachers.
4This literature shows that monetary incentives can influence negatively the individuals’ behavior in terms
of their levels of contribution. The reason is that monetary incentives give the agent a selfish motive to oper-
ate. Explicit incentives from principals may change how tasks are perceived by agents (Gneezy and Rustichini,
2000a) and they may also reduce the value of generous or civic minded acts as a signal of one’s moral character
(Bénabou and Tirole, 2003, 2006). If extrinsic incentives are not large enough, this change in perception can
even lead to undesired effects on behavior (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000b).
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This chapter of the thesis is related to two strands of the literature: the literature on the ef-
fects of competition on managerial incentives and the literature on psychological incentives
in organizations.
Regarding the literature on the effects of competition on managerial incentives, while some
articles argue that competition reduces managerial incentives (see, for example, Hart, 19835),
others show that the relationship is ambiguous (see, for example, Scharfstein, 1988, and Her-
malin, 19926). Schmidt (1997) explains that greater competition may lead to stronger incen-
tives for agents because greater effort is required to avert the threat of bankruptcy. Raith
(2003) examines how the degree of competition among firms in an industry with free entry
and exit affects the incentives for their managers. Then, the effect of competition on in-
centives and effort takes place through a change in the equilibrium number of firms in the
industry. His results suggest an unambiguous positive relationship between competition
and incentives. Baggs and De Bettignies (2007) also conclude that competition increases
managerial incentives. These articles do not consider potential differences in the agents’
preferences or in the principals’ objectives.
Regarding the literature on psychological incentives in organizations (see for instance Bén-
abou and Tirole, 2003, 2006; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000a, 2000b), most articles are princi-
pally focused on the impact of monetary incentives on the individuals’ effort when they are
intrinsically motivated. In this literature, some articles also study the matching of motivated
employees between public and private sector (see for example Besley and Ghatak, 2005, and
Prendergast, 2007).
I try to link together these two strands of the literature. I consider differences in the agents’
preferences and I study the impact of competition and intrinsic motivation on the schools’
outcome in presence of a mixed duopoly environment.
The plan of the paper is as follows: in section 3.2 I present the set-up of the model; section
3.3 is devoted to characterize the equilibrium of the model; in section 3.4 I study the solution
of the game; and concluding remarks are given in section 3.5.
5Hart (1983) is the first to formalize this idea by modeling the effect of competition on the agency problems
between a firm’s owner and a manager.
6Scharfstein (1988) reconsiders Hart’s model while relaxing the assumption of infinitely risk-adverse man-
agers. Hermalin (1992) considers additional effects of competition on the agency problem, all of which are of
potentially ambiguous sign.
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3.2 The Set-Up of the Model
I build a mixed duopoly model where two schools are positioned at each end of a Hotelling
line, with locations xi = 0 and x j = 1, respectively. The school i is public and the school j
is private. The public school maximizes the social welfare. In contrast, the private school
maximizes his profits. Each school is constituted of a principal and an agent, both of whom
are risk neutral. The principal-agent relationship can be interpreted as the relationship be-
tween the school-principal that delegates the decision about an outcome in terms of quality
q to an agent (the teacher). A teacher working in the public sector cannot participate in the
private sector too, and viceversa. There are a continuum of students of mass 1 distributed
uniformly along the line.
The agents are wealth constrained with zero initial wealth and have a reservation wage of
zero. The agents have quadratic effort costs, which are observable to the principal. The ex-
erted effort ϵ determines the quality of the educational services offered by the two schools.
For expositional convenience, I assume that quality q depends linearly on the teachers’ ef-
fort: q = ϵ in both schools. There is no asymmetric information between the principal and
the agent. Since quality is verifiable, the principals do not need to offer an incentive to the
agents because they have all the necessary information to implement the efficient levels of
quality.
In addition, the teachers’ utilities might positively depend on the benefits of the students.
The teachers can be also interested in the impact of their work on the students’ utility. The
measure of this utility depends on the parameter θ that represents the intrinsic motivation
of the agent. It influences the optimal levels of quality and price. There are only two types
of teachers: the self-interested teachers with θ = 0 and the motivated teachers with θ > 0.
There is an infinite number of teachers of both types. The principals offer a wage that covers
the cost of effort paid by the teacher minus his intrinsic motivation.
After the employment decision, the two schools offer imperfectly substitutable services, com-
peting against each other on quality q and prices p.
The timing of the model is as follows. At the initial stage 0, each principal decides whether
to hire a motivated teacher or a non motivated teacher. At stage 1, each principal makes an
offer (ω, q) to their agent. The teachers accept any contract with an expected utility of at least
their reservation utility, which I normalize to 0. If the agents accept the contract, they exert
the required levels of effort; At stage 2, after agents have exerted effort determined by the
contract, principals simultaneously choose prices; At stage 3, the students choose between
the two school.
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3.2.1 The Objective Functions
A student enjoys a utility
Ui = qi −pi − t x from the service offered by the school i and
U j = q j −p j − t (1−x) from the service offered by the school j .
(3.1)
At location x, a student i incurs a transport cost t x for traveling to school i and a cost t (1−x)
to school j . For given pi , p j , qi , q j there is a cutoff x, such that all students with x < x choose
the service of school i , and with x > x choose school j . The parameter t represents the de-
gree of differentiation of the educational services offered by the two schools. When t is low
the schools offer similar programmes, implying fierce competition.
The key assumption of this model is that teachers can be intrinsically motivated. The teach-
ers’ utility function consists of their own “egoistic" payoff, given by the difference between
wage and effort costs, and of their intrinsic motivation. There are two types of teachers: self-
interested teachers with θ = 0 and motivated teachers with θ > 0.
The agents’ utility function from working in the public and private schools, respectively, can
be written as:
Vi =ωi − 1
2
q2i +θiU i
V j =ω j − 1
2
q2j +θ jU j
(3.2)
where U i and U j are the utilities of the average student deciding for school i and school j ,
respectively, and are equal to: U i = qi −pi − t x2 and U j = q j −p j − t (1−x)2 .
The public school i maximizes the social welfare while the private school j maximizes prof-
its. Moreover, both schools obtain a benefit given by the product of price and demand minus
the wage given to the teacher.
More specifically, the public school i maximizes the following:
πi =U i +U j +Vi +V j +pi di −ωi +p j d j −ω j + v − v (3.3)
While the private school j maximizes the following profit function:
π j = p j d j −ω j + v (3.4)
v is strictly positive and represents the funding offered to the private school.7




q2i −θi U i ≥ 0
ω j − 1
2
q2j −θ j U j ≥ 0
(3.5)
7Most private schools in Italy are either authorised or given legal recognition by the state and many receive
state funding.
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The participation constraints guarantee that both teachers do not choose their outside op-
tion.
Assumption 3.1. I make the following assumption to guarantee an interior solution.
• t ∈ (0, 13);





The role of this assumption will become clear in the next sections.
3.3 The Characterization of the Equilibrium
The equilibrium is determined by backward induction.
At stage 3, the students choose the school. A student located at x is indifferent between the
public school i and the private school j if and only if Ui =U j , or equivalently qi −pi − t x =
q j −p j − t (1−x). x represents the demand for the public school i and (1−x) the demand for
the private school j :
x = di (qi , q j , pi , p j , t ) = 1
2
+ (qi −q j )+ (p j −pi )
2t
(1−x) = d j (qi , q j , pi , p j , t ) = 1
2
+ (q j −qi )+ (pi −p j )
2t
(3.6)
At stage 2, the principals choose their prices to maximize their objective functions, taking
qualities and wages as given.
The public school maximizes the social welfare:
max
pi
πi = (1+θi ) U i + (1+θ j ) U j +di pi − 1
2




while the private school maximizes its profits:
max
p j
π j = d j p j −ω j + v (3.8)
Taking the first order conditions of equations (3.7) and (3.8) with respect to pi and p j , re-
spectively, I obtain the following equilibrium prices:
pi =




t (2−3θi −7θ j )






CHAPTER 3. MIXED DUOPOLY WITH MOTIVATED TEACHERS 52
Substituting equilibrium prices into the equations (3.7) and (3.8), I obtain an expression for
social welfare and private profits as a function of the levels of quality and wages offered by
the two schools:
πi = (1+θi ) U i +
[
2(qi −q j )+ t (6+3θi +θ j )
8t
][









+(1+θ j ) U j +
[
2(q j −qi )+ t (2−3θi −θ j )
8t
][


















2(q j −qi )+ t (2−3θi −θ j )
8t
]
−ω j + v (3.11)
At stage 1, these functions are maximized with respect to ωi , qi and ω j , q j , respectively.
I obtain the optimal levels of quality:
q∗i =
32−56t +19θi −44tθi +13θ j −36tθ j
8(3−4t )
q∗j =































The chosen prices at stage 2 are equal to:
p∗i =
t (16−8t +5θi +12tθi −7θ j +28tθ j )
4(3−4t )
p∗j =
t (16−8t +14θi +5θ j +12tθ j )
2(3−4t )
(3.14)
At stage 3 the demands are equal to
d∗i =
8−24t −5θi −12tθi −11θ j −4tθ j
8(3−4t )
d∗j =
16−8t +5θi +12tθ1 +11θ j +4tθ j
8(3−4t )
(3.15)
and the outcomes obtained by the schools are realized:
πi = (1+θi ) U∗i + (1+θ j ) U
∗
j +d∗i p∗i −
1
2
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π j = d∗j p∗j −ω∗j + v (3.17)
There are only two types of agents: the self-interested teachers with θ = 0 and the motivated
teachers with θ > 0. At stage 1, I characterize the equilibrium for different degrees of intrinsic
motivation and I obtain different payoffs:
• when both teachers are self-interested, i.e. θi = θ j = θ = 0 (the equilibrium outcomes
will be denoted by π∗i ,π
∗
j , respectively);
• when teachers are homogeneous and motivated, i.e. θi = θ j = θ > 0 (the equilibrium
outcomes will be denoted by π∗i ,π
∗
j , respectively);
• when only the teacher i is motivated, i.e. θi = θ > 0 and θ j = θ = 0 (the equilibrium
outcomes will be denoted by π̂∗i ,π
∗
j , respectively);
• and, finally, when only the agent j is motivated, i.e. θ j = θ > 0 and θi = θ = 0 (the
equilibrium outcomes will be denoted by π∗i , π̂
∗
j , respectively).
The characterization of the equilibrium for different degrees of intrinsic motivation are in
the Appendix A.
3.4 The Type Choice Game
In stage zero, both firms choose simultaneously which type of agent to hire. Given prices,
quantities and wages, the type choice reduces to the following game:

















Figure 3.1: The Type-Choice Game
I start comparing the benefits obtained by hiring self-interested teachers with those obtained
by hiring only a motivated teacher when there is high competition in the market. Further-
more, I also compare the benefits obtained by hiring motivated teachers with those obtained
by hiring a non-motivated agent when the rival school hires a motivated agent.
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Lemma 3.1. If t < 0.165, then
• π∗i < π̂∗i and π∗j < π̂∗j ;
• π∗i >π∗i and π∗j >π∗j .
Proof. See Appendix B.
If there is high competition between schools (t is small) and both principals hire self-interested
teachers, a principal finds it profitable to deviate by hiring a motivated teacher. By doing so,
the public principal increases the social welfare and the private principal obtains a compar-
ative advantage in terms of demand and price. In addition, if a principal hires a motivated
teacher the best response of the other principal is to hire a motivated agent as well.
This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1. When t < 0.165, the unique Nash equilibrium is the one in which both
schools hire motivated agents.
Proof. See lemma 3.1.
When the public and the private schools offer similar programmes, there is high competi-
tion in the scholastic market. In this case, the public school hires a motivated teacher be-
cause the agent’s intrinsic motivation has a positive impact on the social welfare. Then, the
best response of the private school is to follow suit and to hire a motivated teacher as well.
However, I find that the profits obtained by the private school when both teachers are self-
ish would always be higher than the profits obtained when both teachers are motivated, i.e.
π∗j > π∗j . This result is illustrated in the first graph of figure 3.2. The blue line represents
the profits obtained by the private school when both teachers are self-interested. While the
purple line represents the profits obtained by the private school when both teachers are mo-
tivated. Then, the presence of the public school, and its choice to hire a motivated teacher,
“pushes" the private principal to hire a motivated agent too. This result is illustrated in the
second graph of figure 3.2. Now, the blue line represents the profits of the private school by
hiring a selfish agent when the public school hires a motivated agent. While the purple line
represents always the profits of the private school when both teachers are motivated. The
purple line π∗j is above the blue line π
∗
j until t is low enough. Hence, the private school finds
it profitable to hire a motivated agent as well.
Lemma 3.2. If 0,165 < t < 0.2, then
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Figure 3.2: Comparison Profits of the Private School.
• π∗i > π̂∗i and π∗j < π̂∗j .
• π∗i <π∗i and π∗j >π∗j .
Proof. See Appendix B.
This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 3.2. When 0,165 < t < 0.2, the unique Nash equilibrium is the one in which the
public school hires a selfish teacher, while the private school hires a motivated teacher.
Proof. See lemma 3.2.
As the schools tend to have differentiated educational programmes, the students’ utility is
reduced leading to a reduction of the social welfare. In contrast, the higher the degree of
differentiation of the programmes offered by the schools, the higher the profits obtained by
the schools. This effect has a positive impact on the social welfare. There is a level of t for
which the increase in the students’ utility due to the higher quality provided by the motivated
teachers is more than offset by the reduction in the profits earned by the two schools. In this
case, the public principal hires the selfish teacher. In contrast, the private principal obtains a
comparative advantage by hiring a motivated agent when the public principal hires a selfish
one.
Lemma 3.3. If t > 0.2, then
• π∗i > π̂∗i and π∗j > π̂∗j .
• π∗i <π∗i and π∗j <π∗j .
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Proof. See Appendix B.
This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 3.3. When t > 0.2, the unique Nash equilibrium is the one in which both schools
hire selfish teachers.
Proof. See lemma 3.3.
If the schools offer very different educational services, there is less scope for competition in
the market and the teachers’ intrinsic motivation becomes relatively less important. In that
case, both schools obtain higher benefits by hiring self-interested teachers than by hiring
motivated teachers. Then, the students will choose the school with a programme closer to
their necessity without considering the teachers’ intrinsic motivation.
3.5 Conclusions
In this article, I have shown that the effect of teachers’ intrinsic motivation strictly depends
on the the degree of differentiation of the programmes offered by the two schools. When
there is high competition in the education “market", both schools hire motivated teachers
in order to attract students. In this case, teachers’ motivation plays an important role in the
students’ choice between schools. In contrast, if the schools offer different programmes, the
teachers’ intrinsic motivation becomes relatively less important. In that case, both schools
obtain higher benefits by hiring self-interested teachers than by hiring motivated teachers.
The Nash-equilibrium is the one in which both schools hire selfish teachers.
For future research, it might be interesting to analyze the optimal position of the schools
on the Hotelling line and to study different models of competition. Moreover, a possible
extension of the model is the one in which the quality is unobservable.
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3.6 Appendix A
3.6.1 Characterization of the Equilibrium when Both Teachers are Self-
Interested
I begin by characterizing the equilibrium when teachers are self-interested, i.e. θi = θ j = 0.
At stage 1, the optimal levels of quality and wages are determined.























By hiring selfish individuals, the quality of the educational services is lower in the public
school than in the private school. For this reason, the wage paid to the public teacher has to
be lower than the wage paid to the teacher working in the private school.
The chosen prices at stage 2 are:
p∗i =
2t (2− t )
(3−4t )
p∗j =
4t (2− t )
(3−4t )
(3.20)
When the schools offer similar programmes (low t ) there is more competition in the market
that leads to a low price for both schools. Moreover, with a higher quality offered by the
private school, the private principal sets higher price than the public school, i.e. p∗j > p∗i .








The improvement of the quality permits to the private principal to “steal" the market to the
public school, i.e. d∗j > d∗i > 0.
























































3.6.2 Characterization of the Equilibrium when Teachers are Homoge-
neous and Motivated
In this subsection, I determine the equilibrium when both teachers are homogeneous and
intrinsically motivated, i.e. θi = θ j = θ > 0.








The quality of the services offered by the public school is always lower than the quality of-
fered by the private school, i.e. q∗i < q∗j . The teachers’ intrinsic motivation has a positive
impact on the levels of quality offered by the two schools, i.e.
∂q∗i
∂θ




> 0. The im-
pact of teachers’ intrinsic motivation on the levels of quality is higher in the public school








t < 16 = 0.167.






















8−22t +9t 2 +8θ−13tθ−14t 2θ
2(3−4t )
) (3.25)
The teachers’ intrinsic motivation has a countervailing effect on the wages. On the one hand,
the teachers’ intrinsic motivation has a positive impact on the wages. This is because a high
θ leads to high levels of quality of the educational services. Then, both principals pay high
wages in the way to cover the cost of effort and to improve quality performance. On the other
hand, teachers’ intrinsic motivation has a negative impact on the wages. This is because mo-
tivated teachers provide a given level of quality even if they receive a low compensation for
that. The overall effect is positive in both schools. This result does not support the previ-
ous literature in which motivation is effective in stimulating work effort even in absence of
monetary rewards (see for example Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000a,b and Benabou and Tirole,
2003, 2006). Furthermore, the effect of the agents’ intrinsic motivation on wages is higher in







> 0. This is because given that the
quality offered by the private school is higher, the teacher j has to receive a higher compen-
sation for his work than the teacher i , i.e. ω∗i <ω∗j .
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The price of the public school is lower than the price of the private school, i.e. p∗j > p∗i >
0. Moreover, the impact of the teachers’ intrinsic motivation is different in the two school.
More specifically, the impact of θ on the price of the public school is negative, unless the
programmes offered by the schools are very similar, i.e. t < 120 . In contrast, the impact of the
teachers’ intrinsic motivation on the price of the private school is positive. A higher value of
θ increases the gap between the levels of quality offered by the schools increasing the price
of the private school and reducing the price of the public one.8









(2− t +2θ(1+ t ))
(3−4t )
(3.27)
A higher quality offered by the private school leads to an increase of its demand.
And the profits are realized:
π∗i =
[


























































8−22t +9t 2 +8θ−13tθ−14t 2θ
2(3−4t )
)] (3.29)
8This result is due to the fact that the schools maximize different objective functions. In my previous article
(Manna, 2013), I show that if both principals maximize their profits, the effect of θ on the prices is positive.
Motivation has a positive impact on the quality offered by the firms. It implicitly reduces the product dif-
ferentiation between firms stiffening competition and reducing prices. With higher qualities, the degree of
differentiation of the product becomes relatively less important, leading to fiercer competition.
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3.6.3 Characterization of the Equilibrium when Only the Public Teacher
i is Motivated
Now, suppose that only the agent i is intrinsically motivated, i.e. θi = θ and θ j = 0.









Again, the quality of the services offered by the public school is lower than the quality offered
by the private school, i.e. q̂∗i < q∗j . In addition, the intrinsic motivation of the teacher hiring








> 0. This is due to the fact that an increase of the level of quality offered by
the school i “pushes" the principal j to elicit higher agent effort in order to improve quality.
9




















To maintain the comparative advantage in terms of quality, the principal j provides more
incentives. The private school produces higher levels of quality and provides stronger incen-
tives, i.e. ω̂∗i <ω∗j .






= t (8−4t +7tθ)
(3−4t )
(3.32)
A high agent i ’s degree of motivation has a positive effect on the price of both schools. A high
θ produces an improvement of the quality offered by both schools, which increases its price.
This effect has a positive impact on the marginal profits obtained by the private school and
a negative impact on the students’ utility.








9If the two schools maximized the same objective functions, I would have obtained that the school i has a
comparative advantage with respect to the private school.
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The private school j gains a quality comparative advantage over the public school, and ob-
tains the “business stealing effect": an increase of quality permits to “steal" the market share
to the rival firm. This effect has a positive impact on the marginal profits obtained by the
private school j .

























































Even if only the agent i is motivated, the private school maintain his comparative advantage
in terms of quality.
3.6.4 Characterization of the Equilibrium when Only the Private Teacher
j is Motivated
Finally, when only the agent j is intrinsically motivated, i.e. θi = θ = 0 and θ j = θ j > 0, agents









The quality of the services offered by the public school is lower than the quality offered by
the private school, i.e. q∗
i
< q̂∗j . In addition, the intrinsic motivation of the teacher hiring by









> 0. In addition, this impact of θ on the levels of quality is higher in the
private school than in the public one.
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64−176t +72t 2 +26θ−11tθ−100t 2θ
16(3−4t )
) (3.37)
In this case, the agents’ intrinsic motivation has a positive impact on the wage given to the
unmotivated teacher i . In contrast, the impact of θ on the wage of the motivated teacher j
depends on the value of t and θ. Furthermore, the wage of the public teacher can be higher
than the wage of the private teacher if t < 0.25. If there is competition in the scholastic
market, the public principal has to pay a high wage to the unmotivated teacher i to produce
a larger output. The motivated teacher j provides a given level of effort even if he receives a
low compensation for that.
The prices are given by:
p∗
i






A high agent i ’s degree of motivation has a positive effect on the price of the private school. A
high θ produces an improvement of the quality offered by the private school, which increases
its price. This effect has a positive impact on the marginal profits obtained by the private
school and a negative impact on the students’ utility. Regarding the public school, the impact
of θ on its price is positive if t < 0.25. In this case, the public teacher receives a higher wage
than the private teacher. Then, the public school has to increase the price to repay his agent.








The private school j gains a quality comparative advantage over the public school, and ob-
tains the “business stealing effect": an increase of quality permits to “steal" the market share
to the rival firm. This effect has a positive impact on the marginal profits obtained by the
private school j .
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3.7.1 Proof lemma 3.1., 3.2. and 3.3.
In the first part of these lemmas, I compare the profits when both principals hire self-interested
agents with the one in which only a principal hires a motivated agent. In the lemma 1, I show
that π∗i < π̂∗i and π∗j < π̂∗j for any value of θ and for a value of t small enough.
I start by considering the explicit expression for the public school:
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It is not immediate to see that the inequality holds. The proof unfolds in two steps. First, I
study the marginal effect of the degree of differentiation of the educational services t and of
the agent’s degree of motivation θ on the difference between benefits. Secondly, I show that
the above inequality holds also in a limit case and this completes the proof.
I begin by studying the effect of t on the difference in the benefits obtained by the public




When t is high, the market is less competitive. This reduces the students’ utility and, then,
has a negative impact on the social welfare. In addition, the overall effect of t on the differen-
tial benefits is negative. This is because when the public teacher i is motivated, the degree of
differentiation is relatively less important. In other words, this reduction of the social welfare
is lower than in the case in which both teachers are selfish.
I also analyze the marginal effect of the agent’s intrinsic motivation θ on the benefits. Deriv-
ing equation (3.42) with respect to θ, I obtain the following:
∂(π̂∗i −π∗i )
∂θ
> 0 if t < 0.165 (3.44)
A higher motivation influences positively the social welfare when the public school is the
only one to hire the motivated agent but only if t is small enough. In contrast, it has no effect
on the profits of the firm when both principals hire self-interested agents. Then, the sign of
this derivative is positive for t < 0.165 and negative in other case.
To consider a limit case, I take the maximum value for t in the interval in which it affects
negatively the differential benefits and the minimum value for θ, since their impact on the
differential benefits is positive. If inequality (3.42) holds in this limit case, it will be always
satisfied for other values of these parameters in the interval t ∈ (0;0.165). I set t = 0.164 and
θ = 0.005 and I obtain that π∗i = 0.4214 < 0.4218 = π̂∗i .
Now, I consider the explicit expression for the private school:



































I study the effect of t on the difference in the profits obtained by the private school. Differ-
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The overall effect of the degree of differentiation of the product on the differential profits
is negative. This is because t has a positive impact on the profits of the firm when both
principals hire self-interested teachers but a negative impact when only a principal hires a
motivated teacher. When t increases the comparative advantage by hiring a motivated agent
is reduced.
I also analyze the marginal effect of the agent’s intrinsic motivation θ on the private school’s
profits. Deriving equation (3.45) with respect to θ, I obtain the following:
∂(π̂∗j −π∗j )
∂θ
> 0 if t < 0.2 (3.47)
A higher motivation influences positively the profits when the private school is the only one
to hire the motivated agent but only if t is small enough. This is because the private school
obtains a comparative advantage with respect to the rival school in terms of demand and
price. In contrast, it has no effect on the profits of the firm when both principals hire self-
interested agents. Then, the sign of this derivative is positive for t < 0.2 and negative in other
case.
To consider a limit case, I take the maximum value for t in the interval in which it affects
negatively the differential benefits and the minimum value for θ, since their impact on the
differential benefits is positive. If inequality (3.45) holds in this limit case, it will be always
satisfied for other values of these parameters in the interval t ∈ (0;0.2). I set t = 0.19 and
θ = 0.005 and I obtain that π∗j =−0.81+ v < 0.809+ v = π̂∗j .
When t < 0.165, both schools obtain higher benefits by hiring a motivated agent when the
other school hires a selfish agent. When 0.165 < t < 0.2, only the private school obtains
higher profits by hiring a motivated teacher when the public school hires a selfish one. When
t > 0.2, both schools obtain higher profits by hiring selfish individuals.
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